



#76

A black and white portrait of a man with short hair, smiling, wearing a suit and tie. The background is a dark grey grid of soccer balls.

Tim McMillan

1
00:00:32,790 --> 00:00:30,710

[Music]

2
00:00:34,389 --> 00:00:32,800

hey guys how's it going welcome back to

3
00:00:36,470 --> 00:00:34,399

the channel uh it's good to see

4
00:00:39,110 --> 00:00:36,480

everybody here in the live chat

5
00:00:40,549 --> 00:00:39,120

um yeah let's just jump straight into it

6
00:00:42,229 --> 00:00:40,559

because i'm really excited to speak to

7
00:00:43,270 --> 00:00:42,239

my guest tonight i've spoke to him once

8
00:00:45,190 --> 00:00:43,280

before

9
00:00:47,430 --> 00:00:45,200

but uh yeah it's always a pleasure so

10
00:00:48,869 --> 00:00:47,440

let's jump straight in with if i can

11
00:00:51,110 --> 00:00:48,879

find my cursor

12
00:00:53,189 --> 00:00:51,120

mr ting mcmillan how's it going tim

13
00:00:54,869 --> 00:00:53,199

what's going on vinnie how are you man

14

00:00:56,310 --> 00:00:54,879

good to be here good thank you thank you

15

00:00:58,630 --> 00:00:56,320

so much for coming on yeah i really

16

00:01:01,270 --> 00:00:58,640

appreciate it man i know you're a busy

17

00:01:02,470 --> 00:01:01,280

man so yeah uh it's always good to talk

18

00:01:06,310 --> 00:01:02,480

to you

19

00:01:10,310 --> 00:01:07,590

i thought we'd jump

20

00:01:12,390 --> 00:01:10,320

in to something non-ufo related if

21

00:01:14,149 --> 00:01:12,400

that's okay because a lot of the stuff

22

00:01:15,590 --> 00:01:14,159

that you've been covering primarily

23

00:01:16,789 --> 00:01:15,600

recently has been about the war in

24

00:01:18,310 --> 00:01:16,799

ukraine

25

00:01:19,830 --> 00:01:18,320

so i think it would be

26
00:01:23,190 --> 00:01:19,840
you know almost wrong of me not to bring

27
00:01:24,870 --> 00:01:23,200
it up at some point so i figured i think

28
00:01:26,630 --> 00:01:24,880
the first thing i noticed when it was

29
00:01:28,870 --> 00:01:26,640
started being when it started basically

30
00:01:30,870 --> 00:01:28,880
and it was reported in mainstream media

31
00:01:32,310 --> 00:01:30,880
i very quickly saw things on twitter

32
00:01:34,390 --> 00:01:32,320
that kind of contradict you know those

33
00:01:35,830 --> 00:01:34,400
contradictions all over the place and

34
00:01:37,190 --> 00:01:35,840
soon learned that it was better to start

35
00:01:38,710 --> 00:01:37,200
following the kind of threads that you

36
00:01:40,950 --> 00:01:38,720
were putting out with people like graham

37
00:01:44,149 --> 00:01:40,960
rendell chiming in and you know with

38
00:01:45,590 --> 00:01:44,159

with the knowledge in that so

39

00:01:47,109 --> 00:01:45,600

i don't really know what the question is

40

00:01:48,550 --> 00:01:47,119

i guess it's like

41

00:01:52,469 --> 00:01:48,560

does that worry you that the mainstream

42

00:01:55,030 --> 00:01:52,479

media put out such sketchy information

43

00:01:56,709 --> 00:01:55,040

no i mean here's the thing you know and

44

00:01:58,630 --> 00:01:56,719

one of the things that one of the

45

00:02:00,789 --> 00:01:58,640

reasons that i've been covering it uh so

46

00:02:02,709 --> 00:02:00,799

extensively a couple of reasons one

47

00:02:05,749 --> 00:02:02,719

obviously the defense national security

48

00:02:08,229 --> 00:02:05,759

beat has always been my beat you know i

49

00:02:10,389 --> 00:02:08,239

kind of fell into ufos because frankly

50

00:02:12,229 --> 00:02:10,399

ufos fell into national security in the

51
00:02:13,589 --> 00:02:12,239
last couple years

52
00:02:16,070 --> 00:02:13,599
although arguably i guess they've always

53
00:02:18,550 --> 00:02:16,080
been there and so this was my beat but

54
00:02:20,390 --> 00:02:18,560
addition to that uh you know

55
00:02:22,790 --> 00:02:20,400
eastern europe and particularly russia

56
00:02:24,710 --> 00:02:22,800
has always been an area focused of mine

57
00:02:26,390 --> 00:02:24,720
uh for writings that i've done for the

58
00:02:28,070 --> 00:02:26,400
examiner for a lot of stuff that i've

59
00:02:29,830 --> 00:02:28,080
done when it comes to defense is

60
00:02:32,309 --> 00:02:29,840
actually focused more on europe focus

61
00:02:34,150 --> 00:02:32,319
more on on russia in particular and

62
00:02:35,350 --> 00:02:34,160
vladimir putin and so

63
00:02:38,710 --> 00:02:35,360

this was

64

00:02:40,229 --> 00:02:38,720

kind of my area there and you know

65

00:02:42,949 --> 00:02:40,239

there's a couple of things when it comes

66

00:02:44,070 --> 00:02:42,959

to trying to cover a war and so you know

67

00:02:45,190 --> 00:02:44,080

not to

68

00:02:46,710 --> 00:02:45,200

there's obviously like you said there's

69

00:02:49,830 --> 00:02:46,720

a lot of chaotic information that comes

70

00:02:50,790 --> 00:02:49,840

out but but that's really a filter of

71

00:02:53,190 --> 00:02:50,800

there's

72

00:02:55,509 --> 00:02:53,200

absolute chaos on the ground especially

73

00:02:58,550 --> 00:02:55,519

in those early days of the war you know

74

00:03:00,869 --> 00:02:58,560

both sides nobody knows what's going on

75

00:03:02,710 --> 00:03:00,879

and yet there's this sensational

76

00:03:05,350 --> 00:03:02,720

appetite by the public to know what's

77

00:03:07,350 --> 00:03:05,360

going on and so you get this rapid fire

78

00:03:09,509 --> 00:03:07,360

pace of information coming

79

00:03:11,830 --> 00:03:09,519

and we live in a day and age where that

80

00:03:13,830 --> 00:03:11,840

information you know it was surreal at

81

00:03:16,550 --> 00:03:13,840

times especially very early into this

82

00:03:19,350 --> 00:03:16,560

conflict i was able to watch

83

00:03:21,030 --> 00:03:19,360

live in real time

84

00:03:22,869 --> 00:03:21,040

live webcams that were up at different

85

00:03:24,390 --> 00:03:22,879

places i could watch battles as they

86

00:03:26,149 --> 00:03:24,400

went on live i mean

87

00:03:28,149 --> 00:03:26,159

unprecedented

88

00:03:29,350 --> 00:03:28,159

and so you have this ability there where

89

00:03:32,229 --> 00:03:29,360

you've got this information that's

90

00:03:34,149 --> 00:03:32,239

coming so fast but you're also seeing it

91

00:03:35,750 --> 00:03:34,159

you know we always think it's the truth

92

00:03:37,830 --> 00:03:35,760

on social media but at the same time

93

00:03:39,190 --> 00:03:37,840

it's under a lens there so it's always

94

00:03:40,390 --> 00:03:39,200

just we don't know what's going on

95

00:03:42,149 --> 00:03:40,400

behind the camera you don't know what's

96

00:03:43,990 --> 00:03:42,159

on going on in the periphery

97

00:03:46,149 --> 00:03:44,000

but there's this insatiable need to

98

00:03:48,470 --> 00:03:46,159

share information quick and i think uh

99

00:03:50,710 --> 00:03:48,480

you know for a lot of news outlets

100

00:03:52,550 --> 00:03:50,720

uh the same would be going on for you

101
00:03:54,789 --> 00:03:52,560
know the war in syria or the middle east

102
00:03:56,470 --> 00:03:54,799
where my expertise isn't or if there was

103
00:03:58,789 --> 00:03:56,480
something going on in the pacific

104
00:04:00,470 --> 00:03:58,799
uh you know most news organizations are

105
00:04:02,550 --> 00:04:00,480
jacks of all trades though they have

106
00:04:04,309 --> 00:04:02,560
good bureau beat people

107
00:04:06,710 --> 00:04:04,319
but they're just trying to cover as much

108
00:04:08,550 --> 00:04:06,720
as they can as well as they can

109
00:04:11,270 --> 00:04:08,560
yet competing with that rapid fire i've

110
00:04:13,830 --> 00:04:11,280
got to get info out right now right now

111
00:04:15,910 --> 00:04:13,840
it's a it's definitely a pardon the pun

112
00:04:17,830 --> 00:04:15,920
i know for a lot of the ufo crop it's an

113
00:04:19,990 --> 00:04:17,840

alien feeling because if there's anybody

114

00:04:22,550 --> 00:04:20,000

accustomed to being patient and waiting

115

00:04:24,710 --> 00:04:22,560

months years decades for information

116

00:04:28,310 --> 00:04:24,720

it's the ufo crop and so it is a

117

00:04:29,749 --> 00:04:28,320

different pace but but uh that's that's

118

00:04:31,990 --> 00:04:29,759

primarily why you've seen a lot of

119

00:04:34,150 --> 00:04:32,000

interesting info along with purposeful

120

00:04:36,870 --> 00:04:34,160

misinformed sprinkled in there

121

00:04:38,870 --> 00:04:36,880

yeah and do you think this initially was

122

00:04:40,710 --> 00:04:38,880

planned to be a kind of quick invasion

123

00:04:42,310 --> 00:04:40,720

quick takeover

124

00:04:44,310 --> 00:04:42,320

and because now you know we're hearing

125

00:04:46,469 --> 00:04:44,320

things that it could go on potentially

126

00:04:48,950 --> 00:04:46,479

for a year or longer i mean

127

00:04:50,710 --> 00:04:48,960

it doesn't seem to have gone to plan by

128

00:04:52,629 --> 00:04:50,720

any means

129

00:04:55,270 --> 00:04:52,639

yeah no i mean absolutely i think if you

130

00:04:57,270 --> 00:04:55,280

look at how uh the russian military went

131

00:04:59,189 --> 00:04:57,280

into ukraine they really launched a

132

00:05:00,629 --> 00:04:59,199

pretty audacious plan

133

00:05:02,390 --> 00:05:00,639

uh which was

134

00:05:04,310 --> 00:05:02,400

multiple accesses so they're coming from

135

00:05:05,749 --> 00:05:04,320

multiple directions with the primary

136

00:05:08,310 --> 00:05:05,759

objective being the seizure of the

137

00:05:10,790 --> 00:05:08,320

capital city of kiev to

138

00:05:13,430 --> 00:05:10,800

force a regime change so unseat uh

139

00:05:15,110 --> 00:05:13,440

president zielinski and the the duly

140

00:05:16,629 --> 00:05:15,120

elected leaders that are there so they

141

00:05:17,670 --> 00:05:16,639

could get a favorable government to

142

00:05:19,270 --> 00:05:17,680

their interest

143

00:05:21,350 --> 00:05:19,280

um that's a

144

00:05:24,790 --> 00:05:21,360

it's a really bold plan

145

00:05:27,830 --> 00:05:24,800

and it's one that requires extensive

146

00:05:29,670 --> 00:05:27,840

uh planning it can start requiring

147

00:05:31,430 --> 00:05:29,680

well-trained troops and you really have

148

00:05:34,070 --> 00:05:31,440

to have so many pieces i think there's

149

00:05:36,629 --> 00:05:34,080

times in which people have seen

150

00:05:37,909 --> 00:05:36,639

uh conflicts like uh you know probably

151
00:05:40,390 --> 00:05:37,919
the only thing comparable would be the

152
00:05:42,390 --> 00:05:40,400
u.s invasion uh in iraq

153
00:05:45,749 --> 00:05:42,400
and you see that and relatively the

154
00:05:48,629 --> 00:05:45,759
united states went in there uh and it

155
00:05:50,310 --> 00:05:48,639
was over in in roughly about three days

156
00:05:51,590 --> 00:05:50,320
you know you had in the insurgency that

157
00:05:54,390 --> 00:05:51,600
came afterwards and this is how it

158
00:05:56,070 --> 00:05:54,400
lingered for years but this conflict of

159
00:05:58,230 --> 00:05:56,080
toppling the power and taking over

160
00:06:01,189 --> 00:05:58,240
country happened quickly but that's not

161
00:06:03,270 --> 00:06:01,199
easy and it takes you a really massive

162
00:06:04,870 --> 00:06:03,280
combined arms warfare strategy where

163
00:06:06,950 --> 00:06:04,880

you're combining all these pieces it's

164

00:06:09,590 --> 00:06:06,960

not easy to do and frankly

165

00:06:12,070 --> 00:06:09,600

russia has not even attempted something

166

00:06:13,749 --> 00:06:12,080

of this scale since world war ii and so

167

00:06:16,150 --> 00:06:13,759

they don't have the experience they

168

00:06:18,230 --> 00:06:16,160

actually didn't really engage in

169

00:06:20,150 --> 00:06:18,240

well-combined arms warfare in world war

170

00:06:22,070 --> 00:06:20,160

ii it was more of just a blunderbuss of

171

00:06:23,670 --> 00:06:22,080

just keep punching through

172

00:06:25,990 --> 00:06:23,680

and so

173

00:06:28,150 --> 00:06:26,000

you know their initial plan i think

174

00:06:29,909 --> 00:06:28,160

was based on this rapid seizure of the

175

00:06:31,830 --> 00:06:29,919

the capital i believe that there was

176

00:06:34,070 --> 00:06:31,840

some faulty intelligence i think that's

177

00:06:36,870 --> 00:06:34,080

kind of universally agreed upon uh that

178

00:06:39,350 --> 00:06:36,880

they didn't expect much resistance

179

00:06:41,189 --> 00:06:39,360

and you know very very quickly you know

180

00:06:42,710 --> 00:06:41,199

within the first couple of hours when

181

00:06:45,189 --> 00:06:42,720

they tried to

182

00:06:47,830 --> 00:06:45,199

drop about 200 300 paratroopers into the

183

00:06:49,830 --> 00:06:47,840

hostile airport outside of kiev did they

184

00:06:52,629 --> 00:06:49,840

suddenly discover oh

185

00:06:53,749 --> 00:06:52,639

this is not going to be 2014

186

00:06:56,390 --> 00:06:53,759

uh you know

187

00:06:57,909 --> 00:06:56,400

literally everyone is fighting us

188

00:07:00,870 --> 00:06:57,919

all ukrainians have come together

189

00:07:03,510 --> 00:07:00,880

they're handing out guns so on top of a

190

00:07:05,029 --> 00:07:03,520

military that was bolstered by uh help

191

00:07:06,950 --> 00:07:05,039

from the united states and the united

192

00:07:08,230 --> 00:07:06,960

kingdom you've got ukrainians who are

193

00:07:10,629 --> 00:07:08,240

willing to fight

194

00:07:12,870 --> 00:07:10,639

and so now you know they lost the first

195

00:07:15,510 --> 00:07:12,880

battle of kiev that that plan is over

196

00:07:16,950 --> 00:07:15,520

they were defeated and

197

00:07:18,950 --> 00:07:16,960

now they're trying to launch their

198

00:07:21,670 --> 00:07:18,960

eastern offensive but even that is a

199

00:07:24,070 --> 00:07:21,680

little bit uh precarious and so

200

00:07:28,469 --> 00:07:24,080

when you hear that it could last for

201
00:07:31,029 --> 00:07:28,479
years or more it really depends on

202
00:07:32,629 --> 00:07:31,039
is russia able to advance right now no i

203
00:07:35,589 --> 00:07:32,639
mean they're taking very small

204
00:07:37,670 --> 00:07:35,599
kilometers at a time if anything uh and

205
00:07:39,589 --> 00:07:37,680
so it really will boil down to can they

206
00:07:41,350 --> 00:07:39,599
change that tempo

207
00:07:42,550 --> 00:07:41,360
while engaged in combat which is not

208
00:07:45,749 --> 00:07:42,560
easy to do

209
00:07:47,670 --> 00:07:45,759
and then will ukraine have enough combat

210
00:07:49,189 --> 00:07:47,680
power and ability to turn the table and

211
00:07:50,629 --> 00:07:49,199
start going on the offensive so we

212
00:07:52,550 --> 00:07:50,639
hadn't seen that

213
00:07:55,110 --> 00:07:52,560

so that's where you could see it last

214

00:07:57,270 --> 00:07:55,120

for years potentially i don't

215

00:08:01,029 --> 00:07:57,280

think that it will last

216

00:08:02,309 --> 00:08:01,039

for years uh i think that we will reach

217

00:08:04,390 --> 00:08:02,319

a point where

218

00:08:05,749 --> 00:08:04,400

probably within the next month that

219

00:08:08,309 --> 00:08:05,759

russia is really going to peter out and

220

00:08:10,629 --> 00:08:08,319

expend their ability to do anything on

221

00:08:12,790 --> 00:08:10,639

the eastern front and then provided

222

00:08:15,029 --> 00:08:12,800

ukraine has the reserves and the the

223

00:08:17,270 --> 00:08:15,039

hardware which i think they're getting

224

00:08:19,029 --> 00:08:17,280

in mass from the west uh they'll be able

225

00:08:21,110 --> 00:08:19,039

to turn around and start kind of turning

226

00:08:23,430 --> 00:08:21,120

the tables and maybe pushing russia back

227

00:08:25,430 --> 00:08:23,440

out of their territory

228

00:08:27,350 --> 00:08:25,440

yeah i think it seems as well a lot of

229

00:08:29,029 --> 00:08:27,360

pictures that came out that

230

00:08:31,990 --> 00:08:29,039

the russian artillery and their

231

00:08:33,269 --> 00:08:32,000

armaments and equipment seemed so

232

00:08:35,430 --> 00:08:33,279

old and

233

00:08:37,269 --> 00:08:35,440

questionable and you know that that's

234

00:08:40,389 --> 00:08:37,279

why it was funny because you can relate

235

00:08:41,990 --> 00:08:40,399

it to our uap secret russian technology

236

00:08:43,190 --> 00:08:42,000

and you think if they've if they can't

237

00:08:45,509 --> 00:08:43,200

you know

238

00:08:47,430 --> 00:08:45,519

if they haven't got these basic weapons

239

00:08:49,350 --> 00:08:47,440

do you think they've got super advanced

240

00:08:51,750 --> 00:08:49,360

technology

241

00:08:54,790 --> 00:08:51,760

yep no absolutely i think i said that

242

00:08:57,269 --> 00:08:54,800

very early on i said okay we can

243

00:08:59,269 --> 00:08:57,279

put that issue to rest uh the the

244

00:09:02,389 --> 00:08:59,279

russian federation is not responsible

245

00:09:04,230 --> 00:09:02,399

for the uap encounters that you know

246

00:09:05,590 --> 00:09:04,240

any in my opinion and in particular the

247

00:09:07,350 --> 00:09:05,600

ones the u.s military have been

248

00:09:09,190 --> 00:09:07,360

countering off the united states coast

249

00:09:10,949 --> 00:09:09,200

it's just

250

00:09:12,710 --> 00:09:10,959

to me that's not even something up for

251
00:09:14,630 --> 00:09:12,720
debate uh

252
00:09:16,070 --> 00:09:14,640
even if we were to suggest these were

253
00:09:17,509 --> 00:09:16,080
all misidentifications and they were

254
00:09:18,550 --> 00:09:17,519
more conventional drones that were

255
00:09:20,870 --> 00:09:18,560
russian

256
00:09:22,550 --> 00:09:20,880
um they just demonstrated

257
00:09:23,670 --> 00:09:22,560
absolutely

258
00:09:25,269 --> 00:09:23,680
horrible

259
00:09:27,350 --> 00:09:25,279
isr intelligence surveillance

260
00:09:28,710 --> 00:09:27,360
reconnaissance ability meaning they

261
00:09:31,190 --> 00:09:28,720
don't have

262
00:09:33,829 --> 00:09:31,200
even basic capabilities to get real-time

263
00:09:36,230 --> 00:09:33,839

isr so they surely do not have anything

264

00:09:37,829 --> 00:09:36,240

advanced any type of advanced aerospace

265

00:09:40,150 --> 00:09:37,839

platforms you know

266

00:09:41,910 --> 00:09:40,160

we have learned that a lot of their

267

00:09:44,310 --> 00:09:41,920

claims over the last couple years are

268

00:09:47,030 --> 00:09:44,320

all just that claims their propaganda

269

00:09:50,710 --> 00:09:47,040

their bluster you know we have not their

270

00:09:52,550 --> 00:09:50,720

su-57 supposed first stealth fighters

271

00:09:54,389 --> 00:09:52,560

the first time we'll see them

272

00:09:58,070 --> 00:09:54,399

this year will be them flying over the

273

00:10:00,070 --> 00:09:58,080

mayday parade uh may 9th or the victor

274

00:10:00,949 --> 00:10:00,080

day parade excuse me in moscow they're

275

00:10:03,350 --> 00:10:00,959

going to be

276

00:10:05,030 --> 00:10:03,360

doing an air show they're not

277

00:10:07,030 --> 00:10:05,040

engaged in combat

278

00:10:09,190 --> 00:10:07,040

and so yeah i mean they just russia has

279

00:10:12,150 --> 00:10:09,200

never been their military forces have

280

00:10:13,990 --> 00:10:12,160

never been heavy on the aerospace side

281

00:10:16,550 --> 00:10:14,000

and uh the idea that they could have

282

00:10:17,590 --> 00:10:16,560

left with the technology was always

283

00:10:20,389 --> 00:10:17,600

um

284

00:10:22,470 --> 00:10:20,399

know very unlikely but now i i think we

285

00:10:23,590 --> 00:10:22,480

could say with just about absolute

286

00:10:24,790 --> 00:10:23,600

certainty

287

00:10:26,550 --> 00:10:24,800

absolutely not

288

00:10:27,910 --> 00:10:26,560

this is not russian technology that

289

00:10:30,310 --> 00:10:27,920

people are saying

290

00:10:31,990 --> 00:10:30,320

excellent excellent well i mean i could

291

00:10:33,990 --> 00:10:32,000

do a whole show talking about ukraine

292

00:10:37,350 --> 00:10:34,000

but uh let's move on to ufos before

293

00:10:38,870 --> 00:10:37,360

everybody kind of switches off now yeah

294

00:10:41,590 --> 00:10:38,880

let's get the gary reed thing out the

295

00:10:43,350 --> 00:10:41,600

way because it has been covered a lot um

296

00:10:45,030 --> 00:10:43,360

i'm not sure how much we can talk about

297

00:10:47,190 --> 00:10:45,040

it but just as a couple of points that i

298

00:10:49,509 --> 00:10:47,200

wanted just to sort of get your

299

00:10:52,310 --> 00:10:49,519

clarification on and is that that the

300

00:10:54,710 --> 00:10:52,320

first part i would say is gary reed

301
00:10:55,910 --> 00:10:54,720
he was ousted now does he sit within the

302
00:10:58,150 --> 00:10:55,920
role still without assigned

303
00:10:59,430 --> 00:10:58,160
responsibilities has someone temporarily

304
00:11:01,190 --> 00:10:59,440
taken over

305
00:11:02,550 --> 00:11:01,200
where where are we at with that part of

306
00:11:05,030 --> 00:11:02,560
it right now

307
00:11:06,710 --> 00:11:05,040
sure yeah he he was he was ousted he was

308
00:11:08,550 --> 00:11:06,720
dismissed from the office of the under

309
00:11:10,550 --> 00:11:08,560
secretary of defense for intelligence

310
00:11:12,389 --> 00:11:10,560
okay and one of the things that's very

311
00:11:14,150 --> 00:11:12,399
important to for people to remember is

312
00:11:16,150 --> 00:11:14,160
that within the department of defense of

313
00:11:19,430 --> 00:11:16,160

the us government as a whole uh you know

314

00:11:21,190 --> 00:11:19,440

the us government uh is the the largest

315

00:11:22,389 --> 00:11:21,200

single if we consider the government as

316

00:11:24,630 --> 00:11:22,399

one entity

317

00:11:26,150 --> 00:11:24,640

it is the largest single employer

318

00:11:29,670 --> 00:11:26,160

of people in the world

319

00:11:32,150 --> 00:11:29,680

and on top of that it also has

320

00:11:33,829 --> 00:11:32,160

it can be more like into a giant

321

00:11:35,590 --> 00:11:33,839

industry where you have let's say the

322

00:11:38,230 --> 00:11:35,600

department of defense over here is one

323

00:11:40,150 --> 00:11:38,240

company you have the you know

324

00:11:42,230 --> 00:11:40,160

fbi over here who's another company that

325

00:11:44,310 --> 00:11:42,240

type of thing and then even within those

326

00:11:46,870 --> 00:11:44,320

companies you've got these sub companies

327

00:11:48,949 --> 00:11:46,880

and so the under secretary of defense is

328

00:11:49,990 --> 00:11:48,959

at the pinnacle of the department of

329

00:11:53,670 --> 00:11:50,000

defense

330

00:11:56,470 --> 00:11:53,680

office he has his undersecretaries they

331

00:11:57,910 --> 00:11:56,480

branch off so this is really you know

332

00:12:00,069 --> 00:11:57,920

the plateau

333

00:12:03,110 --> 00:12:00,079

of where you're you're able to get in a

334

00:12:04,310 --> 00:12:03,120

career in in the defense uh department

335

00:12:06,389 --> 00:12:04,320

of defense

336

00:12:09,110 --> 00:12:06,399

and so and particularly the position

337

00:12:10,389 --> 00:12:09,120

that he was in where he was a director

338

00:12:11,829 --> 00:12:10,399

the only way to

339

00:12:13,030 --> 00:12:11,839

achieve a position higher to that is you

340

00:12:14,949 --> 00:12:13,040

have to be appointed you have to be

341

00:12:17,110 --> 00:12:14,959

nominated by the president so this is as

342

00:12:18,389 --> 00:12:17,120

high as you can get if you're just

343

00:12:20,310 --> 00:12:18,399

somebody who

344

00:12:21,990 --> 00:12:20,320

starts from the ground up theoretically

345

00:12:23,110 --> 00:12:22,000

although they rarely do that

346

00:12:25,110 --> 00:12:23,120

um

347

00:12:27,350 --> 00:12:25,120

and so he was

348

00:12:29,750 --> 00:12:27,360

dismissed withdrawn removed from his

349

00:12:32,470 --> 00:12:29,760

position at the under secretary defense

350

00:12:34,790 --> 00:12:32,480

for intelligence he's he's gone for all

351

00:12:36,069 --> 00:12:34,800

intents and purposes he he is

352

00:12:37,590 --> 00:12:36,079

fired

353

00:12:39,350 --> 00:12:37,600

from the under secretary of defense's

354

00:12:42,949 --> 00:12:39,360

office now

355

00:12:45,430 --> 00:12:42,959

it is uh extremely difficult damn near

356

00:12:47,509 --> 00:12:45,440

impossible to actually fire government

357

00:12:49,670 --> 00:12:47,519

employees like outright firearm that you

358

00:12:51,509 --> 00:12:49,680

think of in the private sector okay

359

00:12:52,710 --> 00:12:51,519

you know if you work at a department

360

00:12:54,870 --> 00:12:52,720

store and they want to fire you they

361

00:12:56,310 --> 00:12:54,880

just fire you you're gone you don't have

362

00:12:57,670 --> 00:12:56,320

a job anymore

363

00:12:59,750 --> 00:12:57,680

that's not the case in the u.s

364

00:13:02,389 --> 00:12:59,760

government it is extremely hard

365

00:13:03,910 --> 00:13:02,399

particularly once you reach senior level

366

00:13:05,910 --> 00:13:03,920

positions like this

367

00:13:07,990 --> 00:13:05,920

and so a lot of times they remove you

368

00:13:10,230 --> 00:13:08,000

which is what happened with with uh gary

369

00:13:12,310 --> 00:13:10,240

reid they removed him from that position

370

00:13:15,190 --> 00:13:12,320

yet they're still getting paid by the

371

00:13:17,509 --> 00:13:15,200

department of defense and they're still

372

00:13:19,509 --> 00:13:17,519

in a limbo they call it flying a desk

373

00:13:22,230 --> 00:13:19,519

for a part of time so

374

00:13:25,030 --> 00:13:22,240

it sounds crazy and you think gosh

375

00:13:28,310 --> 00:13:25,040

why does anybody even try to work hard

376

00:13:29,509 --> 00:13:28,320

because i could get fired but still get

377

00:13:31,110 --> 00:13:29,519

a paycheck

378

00:13:33,430 --> 00:13:31,120

and have an office that i show up to and

379

00:13:35,750 --> 00:13:33,440

do nothing and their employees you know

380

00:13:37,590 --> 00:13:35,760

i can i can think of one right

381

00:13:39,509 --> 00:13:37,600

right now off the top of my head who has

382

00:13:41,910 --> 00:13:39,519

been flying a desk for

383

00:13:43,509 --> 00:13:41,920

nine months now you know they do nothing

384

00:13:44,790 --> 00:13:43,519

they do literally do nothing but they're

385

00:13:46,550 --> 00:13:44,800

separated from what they're doing they

386

00:13:48,870 --> 00:13:46,560

have no responsibilities they're not in

387

00:13:50,949 --> 00:13:48,880

direction of anything and so that

388

00:13:54,629 --> 00:13:50,959

happened with him and then once you're

389

00:13:56,389 --> 00:13:54,639

in this limbo position uh it's usually a

390

00:13:58,389 --> 00:13:56,399

it's the government's way of saying it's

391

00:13:59,509 --> 00:13:58,399

very very hard to fire you we want you

392

00:14:01,269 --> 00:13:59,519

to quit

393

00:14:03,189 --> 00:14:01,279

we want you to resign if you'll just

394

00:14:04,870 --> 00:14:03,199

resign we'll give you a cake and you can

395

00:14:06,790 --> 00:14:04,880

go about your merry way

396

00:14:09,030 --> 00:14:06,800

and uh in this case it doesn't look like

397

00:14:10,949 --> 00:14:09,040

mr reed wanted to do that and so then it

398

00:14:13,030 --> 00:14:10,959

becomes a protracted you know legal

399

00:14:15,509 --> 00:14:13,040

battle with general counsel can we do

400

00:14:16,389 --> 00:14:15,519

this can we do that this type of thing

401
00:14:20,550 --> 00:14:16,399
or

402
00:14:22,629 --> 00:14:20,560
have these separate sub components that

403
00:14:25,189 --> 00:14:22,639
are spread out throughout government you

404
00:14:27,350 --> 00:14:25,199
can have somebody that says

405
00:14:29,670 --> 00:14:27,360
i'll take you you can come work for me

406
00:14:31,910 --> 00:14:29,680
you know i you know and this happens

407
00:14:33,910 --> 00:14:31,920
frequently because it is it's there's a

408
00:14:35,910 --> 00:14:33,920
buddy system the reason that uh gary

409
00:14:37,990 --> 00:14:35,920
reed was in the position he was in was

410
00:14:39,829 --> 00:14:38,000
because uh michael vickers the former

411
00:14:40,870 --> 00:14:39,839
under secretary for intelligence brought

412
00:14:41,750 --> 00:14:40,880
him in

413
00:14:43,030 --> 00:14:41,760

um

414

00:14:45,670 --> 00:14:43,040

and so

415

00:14:48,389 --> 00:14:45,680

uh gary reed was then someone at the

416

00:14:51,750 --> 00:14:48,399

defense intelligence agency said okay

417

00:14:53,670 --> 00:14:51,760

we'll you know you can come over here

418

00:14:55,430 --> 00:14:53,680

and so now he is at the defense

419

00:14:58,470 --> 00:14:55,440

intelligence agency

420

00:15:01,269 --> 00:14:58,480

uh in an advisory position

421

00:15:04,949 --> 00:15:01,279

so so not in charge of anybody not uh

422

00:15:08,790 --> 00:15:04,959

not uh you not making any real decisions

423

00:15:09,910 --> 00:15:08,800

and and offering quote advice

424

00:15:12,310 --> 00:15:09,920

and then

425

00:15:14,230 --> 00:15:12,320

that how long that will remain is always

426

00:15:16,389 --> 00:15:14,240

kind of uh

427

00:15:19,189 --> 00:15:16,399

it's up in the air because these type of

428

00:15:21,269 --> 00:15:19,199

positions often is just another way of

429

00:15:23,269 --> 00:15:21,279

saying somebody's flying a desk i just

430

00:15:25,189 --> 00:15:23,279

don't have a desk in here to put it and

431

00:15:26,710 --> 00:15:25,199

so stick him over here that's where he's

432

00:15:27,430 --> 00:15:26,720

going to go to work that's where he'll

433

00:15:31,189 --> 00:15:27,440

go

434

00:15:32,470 --> 00:15:31,199

there every day

435

00:15:34,310 --> 00:15:32,480

and so right now

436

00:15:37,189 --> 00:15:34,320

to the best of my knowledge last i heard

437

00:15:38,870 --> 00:15:37,199

he is at the defense intelligence agency

438

00:15:41,749 --> 00:15:38,880

so

439

00:15:43,990 --> 00:15:41,759

it is it is a nuanced and widely

440

00:15:46,949 --> 00:15:44,000

confusing kind of process

441

00:15:48,629 --> 00:15:46,959

uh i will say that being ousted or being

442

00:15:50,870 --> 00:15:48,639

kicked out as a director of an

443

00:15:53,990 --> 00:15:50,880

intelligence you know he was

444

00:15:55,990 --> 00:15:54,000

up to you know a month ago he was the

445

00:15:57,430 --> 00:15:56,000

most senior counterintelligence law

446

00:15:59,749 --> 00:15:57,440

enforcement security officer for the

447

00:16:01,990 --> 00:15:59,759

department of defense worldwide

448

00:16:03,509 --> 00:16:02,000

huge very significant position and so

449

00:16:06,470 --> 00:16:03,519

being kicked out of that position or

450

00:16:08,710 --> 00:16:06,480

losing that position is

451

00:16:11,829 --> 00:16:08,720

it's not unprecedented but it rarely

452

00:16:12,710 --> 00:16:11,839

happens and it's uh it's a very dramatic

453

00:16:15,509 --> 00:16:12,720

event

454

00:16:16,949 --> 00:16:15,519

and you have to really screw up for that

455

00:16:19,749 --> 00:16:16,959

to happen

456

00:16:22,949 --> 00:16:19,759

yeah absolutely and then his role was

457

00:16:24,389 --> 00:16:22,959

directly uh responsible for aoi msg as

458

00:16:27,350 --> 00:16:24,399

well wasn't it

459

00:16:28,550 --> 00:16:27,360

he was i i can i can say that for a fact

460

00:16:33,590 --> 00:16:28,560

uh

461

00:16:34,629 --> 00:16:33,600

i was was able to obtain the

462

00:16:36,389 --> 00:16:34,639

um

463

00:16:38,870 --> 00:16:36,399

the official classification sheet which

464

00:16:40,550 --> 00:16:38,880

lists the uh the employees and their

465

00:16:41,509 --> 00:16:40,560

roles and the

466

00:16:44,550 --> 00:16:41,519

uh

467

00:16:46,310 --> 00:16:44,560

where they fall into under the the

468

00:16:49,590 --> 00:16:46,320

different programs and everything and so

469

00:16:51,829 --> 00:16:49,600

he was the uh he was the chief executive

470

00:16:53,430 --> 00:16:51,839

uh so he was the senior person in charge

471

00:16:56,389 --> 00:16:53,440

of that and so it's kind of an

472

00:16:57,910 --> 00:16:56,399

interesting thing there because uh for

473

00:17:01,430 --> 00:16:57,920

me it was very interesting because

474

00:17:03,509 --> 00:17:01,440

that's really the the collection of uap

475

00:17:05,750 --> 00:17:03,519

data and this this is really a

476

00:17:07,750 --> 00:17:05,760

intelligence collection um

477

00:17:08,870 --> 00:17:07,760

program it really shouldn't have fallen

478

00:17:11,750 --> 00:17:08,880

under counter intelligence law

479

00:17:14,150 --> 00:17:11,760

enforcement security so so it's a little

480

00:17:15,350 --> 00:17:14,160

odd that it ever felt under that to

481

00:17:18,470 --> 00:17:15,360

begin with

482

00:17:20,630 --> 00:17:18,480

um but that he indeed was the senior uh

483

00:17:21,990 --> 00:17:20,640

principal executive that was in charge

484

00:17:24,230 --> 00:17:22,000

of it

485

00:17:27,429 --> 00:17:24,240

and do you not think that even even the

486

00:17:29,510 --> 00:17:27,439

program sitting in the os uh oh usdi

487

00:17:30,950 --> 00:17:29,520

in itself is a bit strange because they

488

00:17:32,870 --> 00:17:30,960

surely they can't meet the intent of

489

00:17:34,710 --> 00:17:32,880

congress due to the kind of

490

00:17:36,070 --> 00:17:34,720

not being such an operational group

491

00:17:38,549 --> 00:17:36,080

compared to maybe if it was sitting

492

00:17:40,070 --> 00:17:38,559

under odni and dod collaboration or

493

00:17:42,390 --> 00:17:40,080

something like that

494

00:17:44,470 --> 00:17:42,400

sure yeah it's always been in in odd

495

00:17:46,789 --> 00:17:44,480

place because um

496

00:17:48,390 --> 00:17:46,799

usdi for the most part is really just a

497

00:17:49,590 --> 00:17:48,400

policy and

498

00:17:52,630 --> 00:17:49,600

uh

499

00:17:53,830 --> 00:17:52,640

overseer they oversee all the programs

500

00:17:56,470 --> 00:17:53,840

and everything within the department of

501
00:17:58,310 --> 00:17:56,480
defense and so at the operational level

502
00:17:59,750 --> 00:17:58,320
they don't have those personnel so even

503
00:18:01,669 --> 00:17:59,760
though they were

504
00:18:04,150 --> 00:18:01,679
you know technically the overseers and

505
00:18:05,750 --> 00:18:04,160
still are the overseers of that program

506
00:18:07,590 --> 00:18:05,760
at the operational level that has to be

507
00:18:10,390 --> 00:18:07,600
designated to someone else and they can

508
00:18:12,230 --> 00:18:10,400
hire people in to do that specifically

509
00:18:15,590 --> 00:18:12,240
but the the people at the highest levels

510
00:18:16,950 --> 00:18:15,600
who are in charge there they're not uh

511
00:18:19,029 --> 00:18:16,960
they're really not going to be the

512
00:18:20,710 --> 00:18:19,039
people who are collecting reports

513
00:18:22,390 --> 00:18:20,720

analyzing reports surveying reports

514

00:18:25,669 --> 00:18:22,400

anything like that they're just stamping

515

00:18:27,750 --> 00:18:25,679

off on them and uh they they do have

516

00:18:28,710 --> 00:18:27,760

potentially a critical role in this

517

00:18:31,750 --> 00:18:28,720

because

518

00:18:33,430 --> 00:18:31,760

they can stamp off on how how well or

519

00:18:35,510 --> 00:18:33,440

not well

520

00:18:37,669 --> 00:18:35,520

the program is being handled and so if

521

00:18:39,430 --> 00:18:37,679

you're somebody who who certainly

522

00:18:41,430 --> 00:18:39,440

doesn't think that this is an issue that

523

00:18:43,430 --> 00:18:41,440

needs to be going on the us government

524

00:18:47,350 --> 00:18:43,440

doesn't need to be handled uh you can

525

00:18:49,510 --> 00:18:47,360

quite easily you know stamp off on

526

00:18:51,830 --> 00:18:49,520

nonsense or you know

527

00:18:53,590 --> 00:18:51,840

not definitely make it it's easy to put

528

00:18:55,590 --> 00:18:53,600

it out there and say whether you want a

529

00:18:57,430 --> 00:18:55,600

program to fail or succeed i mean it's

530

00:19:00,230 --> 00:18:57,440

in in a highly bureaucratic highly

531

00:19:02,710 --> 00:19:00,240

political system like the us government

532

00:19:04,230 --> 00:19:02,720

and so uh it's always been relatively

533

00:19:08,470 --> 00:19:04,240

interesting though because they're not

534

00:19:11,990 --> 00:19:08,480

an operational component it would be um

535

00:19:14,470 --> 00:19:12,000

frankly to to be well done uh

536

00:19:15,350 --> 00:19:14,480

would take uh

537

00:19:17,669 --> 00:19:15,360

yeah

538

00:19:20,390 --> 00:19:17,679

almost a and another act of congress you

539

00:19:22,950 --> 00:19:20,400

would need a joint all of government

540

00:19:25,510 --> 00:19:22,960

type approach because that you know we

541

00:19:26,390 --> 00:19:25,520

we've i've discussed this a lot is that

542

00:19:27,909 --> 00:19:26,400

uh

543

00:19:29,830 --> 00:19:27,919

you know the department of defense is

544

00:19:31,909 --> 00:19:29,840

limited into what they can look at and

545

00:19:33,190 --> 00:19:31,919

so you know if something flies over the

546

00:19:34,070 --> 00:19:33,200

the continental united states there's

547

00:19:35,909 --> 00:19:34,080

not really anything the department of

548

00:19:38,150 --> 00:19:35,919

defense can do

549

00:19:39,270 --> 00:19:38,160

you know they're not supposed to uh

550

00:19:41,270 --> 00:19:39,280

investigate

551
00:19:43,190 --> 00:19:41,280
over continental united states not

552
00:19:43,909 --> 00:19:43,200
supposed to investigate u.s citizens and

553
00:19:45,669 --> 00:19:43,919
so

554
00:19:47,430 --> 00:19:45,679
that falls under the fbi or department

555
00:19:49,590 --> 00:19:47,440
of homeland security these are totally

556
00:19:51,830 --> 00:19:49,600
separate branches of government so you

557
00:19:54,230 --> 00:19:51,840
really would need a central kind of

558
00:19:55,110 --> 00:19:54,240
whole of government uh

559
00:19:57,430 --> 00:19:55,120
you know

560
00:19:59,750 --> 00:19:57,440
body that could that had the authority

561
00:20:01,029 --> 00:19:59,760
to investigate all of that

562
00:20:03,029 --> 00:20:01,039
because wasn't that one of the problems

563
00:20:05,029 --> 00:20:03,039

with the uh the original

564

00:20:06,950 --> 00:20:05,039

uap task force is that they just didn't

565

00:20:09,190 --> 00:20:06,960

have you know they were they were

566

00:20:10,789 --> 00:20:09,200

roadblocks left right and center for the

567

00:20:12,630 --> 00:20:10,799

you know almost set up to fail from the

568

00:20:13,590 --> 00:20:12,640

start

569

00:20:17,350 --> 00:20:13,600

sure

570

00:20:18,549 --> 00:20:17,360

yeah well i mean and this is um

571

00:20:20,310 --> 00:20:18,559

the thing that's interesting and i've

572

00:20:21,350 --> 00:20:20,320

always said is i think a lot of people

573

00:20:23,590 --> 00:20:21,360

who

574

00:20:27,909 --> 00:20:23,600

have have come into this maybe

575

00:20:29,590 --> 00:20:27,919

purely uap or ufo enthusiast

576

00:20:31,270 --> 00:20:29,600

have have gotten a crash course in

577

00:20:33,590 --> 00:20:31,280

government bureaucracy

578

00:20:34,549 --> 00:20:33,600

and how the u.s government operates

579

00:20:37,270 --> 00:20:34,559

and so

580

00:20:39,029 --> 00:20:37,280

this is not entirely limited to this

581

00:20:41,029 --> 00:20:39,039

topic by any means i mean this goes on

582

00:20:42,630 --> 00:20:41,039

with intelligence topics defense topics

583

00:20:43,990 --> 00:20:42,640

all across the spectrum people don't

584

00:20:45,990 --> 00:20:44,000

want to share it's an extremely

585

00:20:47,510 --> 00:20:46,000

territorial place

586

00:20:50,549 --> 00:20:47,520

and frankly if it's not something that

587

00:20:53,669 --> 00:20:50,559

particularly interests one or one group

588

00:20:56,230 --> 00:20:53,679

or one agency or one area they they will

589

00:20:58,149 --> 00:20:56,240

either not help stonewall uh the

590

00:21:00,070 --> 00:20:58,159

opposite end of that is when it does

591

00:21:01,669 --> 00:21:00,080

become interesting and then suddenly

592

00:21:02,950 --> 00:21:01,679

another group wants to fight and say

593

00:21:06,070 --> 00:21:02,960

well i'm the you know this is supposed

594

00:21:08,149 --> 00:21:06,080

to be my responsibility um that often

595

00:21:10,549 --> 00:21:08,159

goes on between branches of the

596

00:21:12,789 --> 00:21:10,559

government like the us army and

597

00:21:15,430 --> 00:21:12,799

air force will fight over who has

598

00:21:17,029 --> 00:21:15,440

responsibility for certain things and

599

00:21:19,669 --> 00:21:17,039

that's how we get the apache attack

600

00:21:21,270 --> 00:21:19,679

helicopter and the a10 warthog

601
00:21:23,190 --> 00:21:21,280
because the air force and army couldn't

602
00:21:24,310 --> 00:21:23,200
agree on who provided close air support

603
00:21:25,830 --> 00:21:24,320
so they're like well we'll both just

604
00:21:27,350 --> 00:21:25,840
develop our own stuff

605
00:21:28,710 --> 00:21:27,360
and i mean this

606
00:21:32,230 --> 00:21:28,720
so so you

607
00:21:33,990 --> 00:21:32,240
you end up it was always set up

608
00:21:35,909 --> 00:21:34,000
very difficult i mean it's a difficult

609
00:21:37,430 --> 00:21:35,919
topic already

610
00:21:39,590 --> 00:21:37,440
and it's a difficult and that you would

611
00:21:40,870 --> 00:21:39,600
need all of these different players to

612
00:21:43,270 --> 00:21:40,880
play along

613
00:21:45,350 --> 00:21:43,280

and then you run the risk of all these

614

00:21:47,990 --> 00:21:45,360

players also suddenly saying oh there's

615

00:21:49,990 --> 00:21:48,000

something really to this and instead of

616

00:21:52,470 --> 00:21:50,000

working together as a combined effort

617

00:21:53,990 --> 00:21:52,480

suddenly uh space force starts up their

618

00:21:56,070 --> 00:21:54,000

own thing air force starts with their

619

00:21:57,669 --> 00:21:56,080

own thing you know the dod has their own

620

00:21:59,590 --> 00:21:57,679

thing the army has their own thing and

621

00:22:01,669 --> 00:21:59,600

then everybody's actually competing with

622

00:22:04,070 --> 00:22:01,679

each other instead of working together

623

00:22:06,870 --> 00:22:04,080

and so it's always been extremely

624

00:22:08,470 --> 00:22:06,880

problematic and it unfortunately

625

00:22:10,310 --> 00:22:08,480

um

626
00:22:12,070 --> 00:22:10,320
really

627
00:22:13,669 --> 00:22:12,080
this is indicative of how a lot of

628
00:22:15,190 --> 00:22:13,679
things operate in government and i think

629
00:22:17,270 --> 00:22:15,200
that that's why

630
00:22:19,029 --> 00:22:17,280
for a lot of people that's why a lot of

631
00:22:21,110 --> 00:22:19,039
people have spoken to who were in

632
00:22:22,390 --> 00:22:21,120
government being familiar

633
00:22:24,149 --> 00:22:22,400
with government you know even

634
00:22:25,430 --> 00:22:24,159
tangentially which was always

635
00:22:26,710 --> 00:22:25,440
interesting during the gary reid

636
00:22:28,230 --> 00:22:26,720
investigation

637
00:22:30,310 --> 00:22:28,240
i had connections when i was in law

638
00:22:32,390 --> 00:22:30,320

enforcement to that under secretary of

639

00:22:33,909 --> 00:22:32,400

defense for intelligence

640

00:22:35,909 --> 00:22:33,919

of law enforcement because they were law

641

00:22:37,510 --> 00:22:35,919

enforcement and so

642

00:22:38,710 --> 00:22:37,520

tangentially there was there was

643

00:22:40,549 --> 00:22:38,720

different times that i worked for the

644

00:22:43,510 --> 00:22:40,559

dod on stuff

645

00:22:46,149 --> 00:22:43,520

and so um you know knowing and all this

646

00:22:48,710 --> 00:22:46,159

familiarity of it that's why i think

647

00:22:52,070 --> 00:22:48,720

certain things like how atyp came about

648

00:22:54,870 --> 00:22:52,080

and how louis lozando has described atib

649

00:22:56,870 --> 00:22:54,880

and how it operated um

650

00:22:59,830 --> 00:22:56,880

sort of how you know some people get

651
00:23:02,310 --> 00:22:59,840
interpreted outside of the bounds of of

652
00:23:04,630 --> 00:23:02,320
uh authority or or official approval but

653
00:23:08,070 --> 00:23:04,640
it's not necessarily accurate but

654
00:23:09,990 --> 00:23:08,080
frankly these types of of programs and

655
00:23:11,110 --> 00:23:10,000
how that operates are

656
00:23:13,190 --> 00:23:11,120
in

657
00:23:15,029 --> 00:23:13,200
abundance all across government if

658
00:23:16,710 --> 00:23:15,039
there's anybody you've ever

659
00:23:18,390 --> 00:23:16,720
know that's worked in the pentagon

660
00:23:20,070 --> 00:23:18,400
particularly in intelligence will tell

661
00:23:22,070 --> 00:23:20,080
you that anybody who's done any

662
00:23:23,750 --> 00:23:22,080
operational work will tell you that and

663
00:23:26,390 --> 00:23:23,760

they will tell you that's where the best

664

00:23:28,710 --> 00:23:26,400

work is always performed because that's

665

00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:28,720

the only way you can circumvent a lot of

666

00:23:33,430 --> 00:23:31,520

those bureaucratic roblox

667

00:23:34,789 --> 00:23:33,440

yeah absolutely

668

00:23:36,149 --> 00:23:34,799

so i had a question in my head and it

669

00:23:37,510 --> 00:23:36,159

just jumped out because i saw some

670

00:23:39,350 --> 00:23:37,520

comments there

671

00:23:41,430 --> 00:23:39,360

oh it was about you mentioned a tip

672

00:23:43,590 --> 00:23:41,440

there and of course the the debate rages

673

00:23:45,269 --> 00:23:43,600

on with the differences between orsap

674

00:23:47,990 --> 00:23:45,279

and atip and

675

00:23:50,070 --> 00:23:48,000

where atip sat and what responsibilities

676

00:23:51,430 --> 00:23:50,080

it had and what lou had do you think

677

00:23:52,950 --> 00:23:51,440

it's time that that conversation just

678

00:23:56,310 --> 00:23:52,960

gets put to one side because it's kind

679

00:23:58,390 --> 00:23:56,320

of really not doing anybody any favors

680

00:23:59,190 --> 00:23:58,400

um i well

681

00:24:00,390 --> 00:23:59,200

i

682

00:24:02,390 --> 00:24:00,400

for me

683

00:24:03,590 --> 00:24:02,400

i already have

684

00:24:05,510 --> 00:24:03,600

you know

685

00:24:06,950 --> 00:24:05,520

i can't tell people what they can do and

686

00:24:09,190 --> 00:24:06,960

what they want to argue with and bicker

687

00:24:12,149 --> 00:24:09,200

about on on twitter and facebook or

688

00:24:13,669 --> 00:24:12,159

whatever else um i will say that very

689

00:24:15,510 --> 00:24:13,679

rarely does anybody ever see me engage

690

00:24:18,870 --> 00:24:15,520

in that because i have it it's reached

691

00:24:19,590 --> 00:24:18,880

the point now where i don't know uh what

692

00:24:22,549 --> 00:24:19,600

uh

693

00:24:23,669 --> 00:24:22,559

what can be gained from from

694

00:24:25,430 --> 00:24:23,679

you know

695

00:24:27,669 --> 00:24:25,440

getting any kind of clarity or

696

00:24:28,870 --> 00:24:27,679

understanding of of all sap you know

697

00:24:31,590 --> 00:24:28,880

these things where now we're going on

698

00:24:33,350 --> 00:24:31,600

over a decade oh i don't know

699

00:24:36,470 --> 00:24:33,360

you know that's certainly in my opinion

700

00:24:38,630 --> 00:24:36,480

not going to assist in understanding uh

701
00:24:40,470 --> 00:24:38,640
what's going on today what's going on

702
00:24:42,789 --> 00:24:40,480
the contemporary and it's not going to

703
00:24:45,430 --> 00:24:42,799
help solve uap and it's not going to

704
00:24:48,630 --> 00:24:45,440
help solve the government's effort now

705
00:24:50,549 --> 00:24:48,640
and for me personally uh i think that

706
00:24:52,230 --> 00:24:50,559
the core of the claims that were made by

707
00:24:53,110 --> 00:24:52,240
whether it was people in the offset

708
00:24:55,750 --> 00:24:53,120
program

709
00:24:57,190 --> 00:24:55,760
or louis elizondo were always that there

710
00:25:08,950 --> 00:24:57,200
were

711
00:25:10,310 --> 00:25:08,960
within the context of military

712
00:25:12,310 --> 00:25:10,320
situations

713
00:25:14,870 --> 00:25:12,320

and so that core claim for me has

714

00:25:16,230 --> 00:25:14,880

already been substantiated and proven

715

00:25:18,470 --> 00:25:16,240

based on what we've seen in the

716

00:25:20,470 --> 00:25:18,480

evolution uh in the last three or four

717

00:25:22,230 --> 00:25:20,480

years you know when you're seeing uh

718

00:25:23,830 --> 00:25:22,240

congressional legislation being passed

719

00:25:25,830 --> 00:25:23,840

when you're seeing lawmakers speak about

720

00:25:28,630 --> 00:25:25,840

it publicly when you're seeing that kind

721

00:25:32,070 --> 00:25:28,640

of thing that did that in my opinion

722

00:25:34,230 --> 00:25:32,080

has has established that core claim

723

00:25:36,789 --> 00:25:34,240

is valid and so we can kind of move

724

00:25:38,470 --> 00:25:36,799

forward from there i don't know what i

725

00:25:39,590 --> 00:25:38,480

don't know why

726

00:25:42,310 --> 00:25:39,600

or what

727

00:25:46,950 --> 00:25:42,320

is it hope to be gained by that you know

728

00:25:47,990 --> 00:25:46,960

other than uh maybe ridicule and um

729

00:25:50,870 --> 00:25:48,000

yeah

730

00:25:52,789 --> 00:25:50,880

to that end i would just say that is a

731

00:25:55,590 --> 00:25:52,799

an interesting way to go about an

732

00:25:57,110 --> 00:25:55,600

argument because um

733

00:25:58,630 --> 00:25:57,120

they're mutually exclusive you can

734

00:26:00,630 --> 00:25:58,640

actually you can have people who believe

735

00:26:02,870 --> 00:26:00,640

weird things you can have people who are

736

00:26:04,549 --> 00:26:02,880

crazy uh you know ramadan the

737

00:26:06,230 --> 00:26:04,559

mathematician the famous indian

738

00:26:07,430 --> 00:26:06,240

mathematician belief that a hindu

739

00:26:08,830 --> 00:26:07,440

goddess

740

00:26:11,510 --> 00:26:08,840

taught him

741

00:26:14,310 --> 00:26:11,520

um what we use now the mathematics that

742

00:26:17,269 --> 00:26:14,320

we now use for computers that taught him

743

00:26:20,070 --> 00:26:17,279

uh you know an entirely new branch of

744

00:26:21,669 --> 00:26:20,080

mathematics did he i don't know

745

00:26:23,350 --> 00:26:21,679

but i do know that that is the

746

00:26:25,750 --> 00:26:23,360

mathematics you know modular mathematics

747

00:26:27,510 --> 00:26:25,760

is what we use today we can thank that

748

00:26:29,430 --> 00:26:27,520

in large part to us being able to

749

00:26:30,470 --> 00:26:29,440

communicate right now and use a computer

750

00:26:32,470 --> 00:26:30,480

and so

751
00:26:35,669 --> 00:26:32,480
it is mutually exclusive that people can

752
00:26:37,590 --> 00:26:35,679
have fantastical beliefs you know and

753
00:26:39,830 --> 00:26:37,600
claim to have seen a werewolf or you

754
00:26:41,430 --> 00:26:39,840
know whatever skinwalker ranch maybe

755
00:26:43,590 --> 00:26:41,440
they did maybe they didn't but that's

756
00:26:46,149 --> 00:26:43,600
mutually exclusive from are there these

757
00:26:47,590 --> 00:26:46,159
events going on that pilots or or other

758
00:26:49,190 --> 00:26:47,600
service members or just the average

759
00:26:51,510 --> 00:26:49,200
public are encountering

760
00:26:52,549 --> 00:26:51,520
two different things so i don't know

761
00:26:55,590 --> 00:26:52,559
i don't

762
00:26:57,669 --> 00:26:55,600
what it's kind of the old

763
00:26:59,510 --> 00:26:57,679

uh you know it's it's not even throwing

764

00:27:02,230 --> 00:26:59,520

the baby out with the bath water it's

765

00:27:04,070 --> 00:27:02,240

you're trying to boil the baby while cur

766

00:27:05,669 --> 00:27:04,080

turning the water up

767

00:27:07,190 --> 00:27:05,679

and it's

768

00:27:08,870 --> 00:27:07,200

to no end

769

00:27:10,549 --> 00:27:08,880

yeah that's what it seems like it really

770

00:27:12,390 --> 00:27:10,559

does seem like it's just a

771

00:27:14,310 --> 00:27:12,400

just a recurring groundhog day of

772

00:27:15,750 --> 00:27:14,320

conversation and argument and debate and

773

00:27:18,310 --> 00:27:15,760

it's just

774

00:27:19,669 --> 00:27:18,320

yeah yeah i i agree with everything you

775

00:27:21,909 --> 00:27:19,679

said there yeah

776

00:27:22,710 --> 00:27:21,919

yeah i i don't i don't i truly don't

777

00:27:27,110 --> 00:27:22,720

know

778

00:27:29,590 --> 00:27:27,120

other than i will say that uh in my

779

00:27:31,190 --> 00:27:29,600

experience those kinds of questions even

780

00:27:32,870 --> 00:27:31,200

if people have valid questions there's

781

00:27:35,510 --> 00:27:32,880

nothing wrong with answering them they

782

00:27:37,110 --> 00:27:35,520

aren't answered typically by twitter and

783

00:27:38,950 --> 00:27:37,120

they aren't answered on facebook you

784

00:27:41,750 --> 00:27:38,960

actually have to get out of that kind of

785

00:27:44,950 --> 00:27:41,760

echo chamber and there's

786

00:27:46,710 --> 00:27:44,960

okay i'm an expert of nothing and so um

787

00:27:48,950 --> 00:27:46,720

you know anything that i i've commented

788

00:27:50,230 --> 00:27:48,960

on yeah i don't know i talk to people

789

00:27:52,389 --> 00:27:50,240

who know i talk to people that know in

790

00:27:54,149 --> 00:27:52,399

the system and that even extends beyond

791

00:27:56,070 --> 00:27:54,159

i see this a lot where people say well

792

00:27:58,070 --> 00:27:56,080

lou said this or lou said that or chris

793

00:28:00,149 --> 00:27:58,080

melvin said this is a christmas so that

794

00:28:02,470 --> 00:28:00,159

this type of thing we'll find out how

795

00:28:04,149 --> 00:28:02,480

normal is what they're saying in the

796

00:28:06,070 --> 00:28:04,159

context of the setting that they're

797

00:28:09,269 --> 00:28:06,080

saying it in and that means you know for

798

00:28:11,669 --> 00:28:09,279

me is investigative journalist i don't

799

00:28:13,350 --> 00:28:11,679

you know i don't ask lou or chris if

800

00:28:14,950 --> 00:28:13,360

this is normal because i already know

801
00:28:17,669 --> 00:28:14,960
they're biased you know we already know

802
00:28:19,830 --> 00:28:17,679
what theirs is you ask people who work

803
00:28:21,750 --> 00:28:19,840
in those government systems

804
00:28:24,389 --> 00:28:21,760
what's normal what's not normal and you

805
00:28:26,789 --> 00:28:24,399
can ask those questions outside of uh

806
00:28:28,789 --> 00:28:26,799
outside of ufos you know i saw there was

807
00:28:31,269 --> 00:28:28,799
recently a raging debate about the the

808
00:28:34,789 --> 00:28:31,279
crada and the ttsa thing

809
00:28:39,190 --> 00:28:37,430
why doesn't anybody contact anybody who

810
00:28:40,710 --> 00:28:39,200
works in government contracts or has

811
00:28:42,549 --> 00:28:40,720
worked in government contracts or a

812
00:28:45,430 --> 00:28:42,559
government watchdog there's plenty of

813
00:28:47,110 --> 00:28:45,440

those ngos out there and just ask them

814

00:28:50,149 --> 00:28:47,120

how does kratos work you know how does

815

00:28:52,389 --> 00:28:50,159

this work is this normal i mean

816

00:28:54,710 --> 00:28:52,399

just ask them we don't have to interpret

817

00:28:56,630 --> 00:28:54,720

or debate it but but that's uh i'll get

818

00:28:58,789 --> 00:28:56,640

off my soapbox but to answer your

819

00:29:00,630 --> 00:28:58,799

question there i think um

820

00:29:02,310 --> 00:29:00,640

particularly we seem to beat a lot of

821

00:29:05,669 --> 00:29:02,320

questions to death that we don't even

822

00:29:06,789 --> 00:29:05,679

try to answer at times we just continue

823

00:29:11,110 --> 00:29:06,799

on

824

00:29:12,549 --> 00:29:11,120

have for you was regarding classified

825

00:29:14,310 --> 00:29:12,559

briefings and then

826

00:29:15,830 --> 00:29:14,320

literally within the hour leading up to

827

00:29:18,070 --> 00:29:15,840

me speaking with you we saw a new

828

00:29:20,310 --> 00:29:18,080

article from brian bender in politico

829

00:29:21,510 --> 00:29:20,320

titled the ufo briefings on capitol hill

830

00:29:23,510 --> 00:29:21,520

have begun

831

00:29:25,430 --> 00:29:23,520

lawmakers aren't impressed have you had

832

00:29:27,029 --> 00:29:25,440

time to scan it at all

833

00:29:29,350 --> 00:29:27,039

i haven't you're breaking this news to

834

00:29:30,950 --> 00:29:29,360

me so i have not seen uh i haven't read

835

00:29:33,430 --> 00:29:30,960

the article yet i haven't heard about it

836

00:29:35,269 --> 00:29:33,440

so yeah now i'm curious

837

00:29:36,870 --> 00:29:35,279

it's it's i mean i have i've read it

838

00:29:38,950 --> 00:29:36,880

once but obviously i like to go back and

839

00:29:41,190 --> 00:29:38,960

kind of really sort of uh

840

00:29:42,630 --> 00:29:41,200

take my time to absorb it but the it

841

00:29:44,549 --> 00:29:42,640

does seem like the congress are really

842

00:29:46,230 --> 00:29:44,559

trying to put pressure on now um but

843

00:29:47,909 --> 00:29:46,240

there was one statement which i'm just

844

00:29:50,630 --> 00:29:47,919

gonna find and read out that did

845

00:29:52,149 --> 00:29:50,640

actually stand out to me and

846

00:29:53,590 --> 00:29:52,159

typical are probably not gonna be able

847

00:29:55,029 --> 00:29:53,600

to find it now

848

00:29:56,470 --> 00:29:55,039

ah here it is

849

00:29:58,470 --> 00:29:56,480

it says

850

00:30:00,310 --> 00:29:58,480

quote i have seen everything we have in

851

00:30:02,870 --> 00:30:00,320

the files and i am very confident that

852

00:30:05,269 --> 00:30:02,880

they are not ours said a former senior

853

00:30:07,909 --> 00:30:05,279

intelligence official who had authority

854

00:30:11,669 --> 00:30:07,919

over the ufo portfolio referring to

855

00:30:14,310 --> 00:30:11,679

classified us aircraft programs

856

00:30:15,830 --> 00:30:14,320

it just stood out you know i think uh

857

00:30:17,350 --> 00:30:15,840

sure yeah

858

00:30:19,590 --> 00:30:17,360

that's what i was really curious what

859

00:30:20,710 --> 00:30:19,600

was your um now i'm gonna interview you

860

00:30:21,990 --> 00:30:20,720

vinny

861

00:30:23,510 --> 00:30:22,000

what was your general feel from the

862

00:30:24,549 --> 00:30:23,520

article was it when you said that they

863

00:30:26,230 --> 00:30:24,559

weren't impressed were they not

864

00:30:28,149 --> 00:30:26,240

impressed with the sightings being

865

00:30:30,310 --> 00:30:28,159

presented or the work being done did you

866

00:30:32,070 --> 00:30:30,320

say i think uh i think they kind of

867

00:30:34,149 --> 00:30:32,080

seemed like they were okay with the

868

00:30:36,149 --> 00:30:34,159

collection of everything but then it was

869

00:30:38,149 --> 00:30:36,159

kind of like they really need to deal

870

00:30:40,070 --> 00:30:38,159

with doing something with it now that

871

00:30:43,269 --> 00:30:40,080

kind of was the initial thing i got from

872

00:30:44,950 --> 00:30:43,279

that that first read um it might change

873

00:30:46,070 --> 00:30:44,960

the second time i read it but that was

874

00:30:47,510 --> 00:30:46,080

kind of the first thing that really

875

00:30:49,750 --> 00:30:47,520

stood out

876

00:30:51,590 --> 00:30:49,760

sure well and i said i'll be eager to

877

00:30:52,870 --> 00:30:51,600

look at that because that

878

00:30:54,310 --> 00:30:52,880

that's what i'm curious about what you

879

00:30:56,230 --> 00:30:54,320

mentioned is kind of an interesting

880

00:30:58,310 --> 00:30:56,240

aspect of all of this because

881

00:31:00,630 --> 00:30:58,320

being familiar with

882

00:31:03,590 --> 00:31:00,640

the intelligence collection process

883

00:31:06,389 --> 00:31:03,600

uh this is a slow-moving process and

884

00:31:10,070 --> 00:31:06,399

whereas i know a lot of a lot of people

885

00:31:13,350 --> 00:31:12,149

are really kind of aghast at the idea

886

00:31:14,710 --> 00:31:13,360

that the government could be treating

887

00:31:16,149 --> 00:31:14,720

this as if they're discovering it for

888

00:31:17,190 --> 00:31:16,159

the first time and going through this

889

00:31:18,950 --> 00:31:17,200

process of what's called the

890

00:31:20,950 --> 00:31:18,960

intelligence cycle

891

00:31:22,149 --> 00:31:20,960

for the first time whether that's true

892

00:31:24,149 --> 00:31:22,159

or not i don't know but they're

893

00:31:26,630 --> 00:31:24,159

definitely treating it that way and so

894

00:31:29,110 --> 00:31:26,640

that cycle is a slow-moving process

895

00:31:30,549 --> 00:31:29,120

because it's they're unlike what we see

896

00:31:33,029 --> 00:31:30,559

when we see intelligence whether it's on

897

00:31:34,389 --> 00:31:33,039

ukraine or russia or whatever else these

898

00:31:36,789 --> 00:31:34,399

are programs that have been going on for

899

00:31:39,269 --> 00:31:36,799

decades you know they're well firm this

900

00:31:41,190 --> 00:31:39,279

is as if they're treating it a topic

901
00:31:43,350 --> 00:31:41,200
that they've never dealt with before and

902
00:31:45,669 --> 00:31:43,360
so it's this collection

903
00:31:47,590 --> 00:31:45,679
baseline interpretation of the data

904
00:31:49,750 --> 00:31:47,600
where do we go from here kind of

905
00:31:50,710 --> 00:31:49,760
circular process here

906
00:31:53,029 --> 00:31:50,720
and so

907
00:31:55,029 --> 00:31:53,039
it is interesting because i think um

908
00:31:57,110 --> 00:31:55,039
that's what i'm curious about is you you

909
00:31:58,149 --> 00:31:57,120
reach this part where you've collected

910
00:31:59,350 --> 00:31:58,159
but then

911
00:32:00,950 --> 00:31:59,360
i think the thing that frustrates

912
00:32:02,310 --> 00:32:00,960
probably lawmakers

913
00:32:04,950 --> 00:32:02,320

just based on the sound of what you said

914

00:32:07,430 --> 00:32:04,960

and the rest of us is that first stage

915

00:32:09,430 --> 00:32:07,440

is you've got all this you say well here

916

00:32:11,110 --> 00:32:09,440

it is we know this this and this is real

917

00:32:13,110 --> 00:32:11,120

or this is occurring and then when you

918

00:32:14,870 --> 00:32:13,120

say well what is it and you go i don't

919

00:32:16,149 --> 00:32:14,880

know

920

00:32:19,029 --> 00:32:16,159

that's frustrating i think it's

921

00:32:21,590 --> 00:32:19,039

frustrating for everybody and so it uh

922

00:32:25,110 --> 00:32:21,600

i'm curious to but that's always been

923

00:32:27,029 --> 00:32:25,120

where i have interpreted the process was

924

00:32:28,789 --> 00:32:27,039

yeah yeah a fractal mine here in the

925

00:32:31,430 --> 00:32:28,799

chat raises a good point

926
00:32:33,909 --> 00:32:31,440
and that the law make the lawmakers

927
00:32:35,350 --> 00:32:33,919
aren't impressed

928
00:32:37,110 --> 00:32:35,360
here we go

929
00:32:38,710 --> 00:32:37,120
agencies need to take this issue more

930
00:32:40,149 --> 00:32:38,720
seriously so the lawmakers aren't

931
00:32:42,149 --> 00:32:40,159
impressed that there doesn't seem to be

932
00:32:43,190 --> 00:32:42,159
that sense of urgency and seriousness

933
00:32:47,909 --> 00:32:43,200
from the

934
00:32:51,509 --> 00:32:49,590
you know

935
00:32:53,029 --> 00:32:51,519
sure and that's was the other side i was

936
00:32:55,990 --> 00:32:53,039
just curious about because i can see

937
00:32:59,430 --> 00:32:56,000
that as well wholeheartedly and i think

938
00:33:01,269 --> 00:32:59,440

uh i mean i truly believe that if uh if

939

00:33:03,590 --> 00:33:01,279

they're going to be able to achieve what

940

00:33:04,950 --> 00:33:03,600

lawmakers want uh and what the lawmakers

941

00:33:06,230 --> 00:33:04,960

have requested

942

00:33:07,509 --> 00:33:06,240

and has been signed in law by the

943

00:33:10,389 --> 00:33:07,519

president of the united states so so

944

00:33:11,990 --> 00:33:10,399

they're obligated to provide is going to

945

00:33:15,029 --> 00:33:12,000

require them

946

00:33:16,870 --> 00:33:15,039

to really designate specific people to

947

00:33:18,789 --> 00:33:16,880

handle this task

948

00:33:21,190 --> 00:33:18,799

outside of how i think they have tried

949

00:33:23,509 --> 00:33:21,200

to handle it especially

950

00:33:25,509 --> 00:33:23,519

beginning at the beginning of last year

951
00:33:28,549 --> 00:33:25,519
you know there was some shuffling

952
00:33:32,230 --> 00:33:28,559
uh inside who was handling it the the

953
00:33:35,190 --> 00:33:32,240
people who were handling it from 2017

954
00:33:37,190 --> 00:33:35,200
to 2020 kind of changed hands and so

955
00:33:39,029 --> 00:33:37,200
then there was this hot potato kind of

956
00:33:39,830 --> 00:33:39,039
mix of it but it was handed to people

957
00:33:41,909 --> 00:33:39,840
who

958
00:33:44,149 --> 00:33:41,919
this wasn't their only job designation

959
00:33:46,070 --> 00:33:44,159
and they had other portfolios and other

960
00:33:48,230 --> 00:33:46,080
things going on i think it's going to be

961
00:33:51,190 --> 00:33:48,240
extremely hard to try to investigate

962
00:33:52,870 --> 00:33:51,200
this under that precedent because uh you

963
00:33:54,389 --> 00:33:52,880

know if you're trying to juggle defense

964

00:33:56,070 --> 00:33:54,399

and intelligence things you're you're

965

00:33:57,430 --> 00:33:56,080

always going to have things that are

966

00:33:59,029 --> 00:33:57,440

going on in the world

967

00:34:01,509 --> 00:33:59,039

that are more pressing

968

00:34:04,549 --> 00:34:01,519

and seem more immediate that than your

969

00:34:06,630 --> 00:34:04,559

ap does you know we can and i know that

970

00:34:08,550 --> 00:34:06,640

that frustrates some people and when

971

00:34:10,950 --> 00:34:08,560

when i say that um

972

00:34:12,230 --> 00:34:10,960

but it's the same reason that we open

973

00:34:13,990 --> 00:34:12,240

this conversation i've been covering

974

00:34:16,149 --> 00:34:14,000

ukraine for the last two months it's

975

00:34:18,710 --> 00:34:16,159

very immediate it's a it's an area of

976
00:34:19,990 --> 00:34:18,720
where my my interest and expertise lies

977
00:34:22,310 --> 00:34:20,000
and it's very immediate where there's

978
00:34:23,430 --> 00:34:22,320
lives being lost lives are being changed

979
00:34:25,589 --> 00:34:23,440
uh

980
00:34:26,310 --> 00:34:25,599
the effects of what's going on there you

981
00:34:28,710 --> 00:34:26,320
know

982
00:34:29,829 --> 00:34:28,720
dramatically change people's lives

983
00:34:32,550 --> 00:34:29,839
instantly

984
00:34:34,950 --> 00:34:32,560
uh and permanently whereas uap you could

985
00:34:36,950 --> 00:34:34,960
say man this has been around for decades

986
00:34:38,149 --> 00:34:36,960
they're not attacking us you know maybe

987
00:34:39,349 --> 00:34:38,159
longer

988
00:34:41,190 --> 00:34:39,359

there's always going to be something

989

00:34:43,430 --> 00:34:41,200

that seems to be more immediate and so

990

00:34:45,030 --> 00:34:43,440

is is russia going to nuke us is north

991

00:34:46,470 --> 00:34:45,040

korea going to nuke us

992

00:34:47,990 --> 00:34:46,480

if you're if you're talking to defense

993

00:34:50,149 --> 00:34:48,000

and intelligence people that is always

994

00:34:53,190 --> 00:34:50,159

going to take precedent over

995

00:34:54,230 --> 00:34:53,200

uap i'm not sure i understand but that

996

00:34:55,270 --> 00:34:54,240

is not

997

00:34:58,069 --> 00:34:55,280

what

998

00:34:59,829 --> 00:34:58,079

i don't even know where that came from

999

00:35:04,390 --> 00:34:59,839

but

1000

00:35:06,390 --> 00:35:04,400

i was like what the hell jesus

1001
00:35:08,310 --> 00:35:06,400
the cia is listening to me um

1002
00:35:10,150 --> 00:35:08,320
[Laughter]

1003
00:35:12,230 --> 00:35:10,160
see they're agreeing they're not sure

1004
00:35:14,390 --> 00:35:12,240
they understand uh but that doesn't mean

1005
00:35:16,710 --> 00:35:14,400
that there's a lot of issues that aren't

1006
00:35:18,069 --> 00:35:16,720
as pressing as being is full-on nuclear

1007
00:35:19,750 --> 00:35:18,079
war

1008
00:35:21,349 --> 00:35:19,760
that still need to be handled and still

1009
00:35:23,349 --> 00:35:21,359
need to be discussed they still need to

1010
00:35:25,670 --> 00:35:23,359
be investigated and this is one of them

1011
00:35:27,030 --> 00:35:25,680
and so i think i would wholeheartedly

1012
00:35:28,630 --> 00:35:27,040
agree

1013
00:35:30,550 --> 00:35:28,640

we certainly spend a lot of money on a

1014

00:35:33,430 --> 00:35:30,560

lot of different things

1015

00:35:35,190 --> 00:35:33,440

that are perhaps not nearly as pressing

1016

00:35:37,109 --> 00:35:35,200

so i don't want to take anybody away

1017

00:35:39,670 --> 00:35:37,119

from their national security work let's

1018

00:35:41,349 --> 00:35:39,680

just get some other people to do it

1019

00:35:43,430 --> 00:35:41,359

i think one thing that we noticed last

1020

00:35:46,870 --> 00:35:43,440

year specifically in the lead up to the

1021

00:35:47,990 --> 00:35:46,880

uh uap task force preliminary assessment

1022

00:35:49,190 --> 00:35:48,000

is that the

1023

00:35:50,470 --> 00:35:49,200

there was members

1024

00:35:52,630 --> 00:35:50,480

of people on capitol hill were getting

1025

00:35:54,390 --> 00:35:52,640

briefings and we saw senators and and

1026

00:35:56,710 --> 00:35:54,400

that talking on the steps coming out

1027

00:35:58,150 --> 00:35:56,720

saying yes we've had briefings and even

1028

00:35:59,750 --> 00:35:58,160

though they didn't say anything about

1029

00:36:02,230 --> 00:35:59,760

them just the fact that they were there

1030

00:36:04,630 --> 00:36:02,240

on tv for people to see was a positive

1031

00:36:06,230 --> 00:36:04,640

thing for the community and so what i

1032

00:36:08,230 --> 00:36:06,240

was sort of looking

1033

00:36:09,510 --> 00:36:08,240

looking at was will we see that again

1034

00:36:11,109 --> 00:36:09,520

with the amount of

1035

00:36:12,550 --> 00:36:11,119

apparent classified briefings that are

1036

00:36:14,630 --> 00:36:12,560

due this year

1037

00:36:16,150 --> 00:36:14,640

you know are we likely to see them a

1038

00:36:17,030 --> 00:36:16,160

similar kind of thing because i think it

1039

00:36:18,950 --> 00:36:17,040

does

1040

00:36:20,550 --> 00:36:18,960

it is good to hear from these people on

1041

00:36:21,510 --> 00:36:20,560

tv

1042

00:36:24,790 --> 00:36:21,520

sure

1043

00:36:26,310 --> 00:36:24,800

and i i think it it uh it was nice it

1044

00:36:28,310 --> 00:36:26,320

was very interesting i think a lot of

1045

00:36:29,910 --> 00:36:28,320

the responses were

1046

00:36:32,550 --> 00:36:29,920

you know really interesting especially

1047

00:36:34,550 --> 00:36:32,560

when you saw lawmakers like marco rubio

1048

00:36:35,750 --> 00:36:34,560

and people coming out on tv and

1049

00:36:37,430 --> 00:36:35,760

discussing them you know these are

1050

00:36:38,790 --> 00:36:37,440

people who are very vested in their

1051

00:36:40,550 --> 00:36:38,800

political careers and so if they're

1052

00:36:42,950 --> 00:36:40,560

willing to talk about it publicly

1053

00:36:45,670 --> 00:36:42,960

frankly that only further establishes

1054

00:36:48,150 --> 00:36:45,680

the legitimacy of the topic and so will

1055

00:36:50,550 --> 00:36:48,160

we see that or not again i don't know

1056

00:36:52,069 --> 00:36:50,560

obviously they're very limited uh in

1057

00:36:53,430 --> 00:36:52,079

terms of what they can say you know

1058

00:36:55,510 --> 00:36:53,440

classified

1059

00:36:57,270 --> 00:36:55,520

congress in and of itself and i think

1060

00:36:59,190 --> 00:36:57,280

this is maybe an area where where some

1061

00:37:01,990 --> 00:36:59,200

people have been confused but the

1062

00:37:04,069 --> 00:37:02,000

confidence congress has no authority to

1063

00:37:04,790 --> 00:37:04,079

declassify anything

1064

00:37:07,670 --> 00:37:04,800

so

1065

00:37:09,990 --> 00:37:07,680

they can't even declassify this stuff if

1066

00:37:12,470 --> 00:37:10,000

they wanted to nor can they discuss it

1067

00:37:13,829 --> 00:37:12,480

if it's classified um they just they

1068

00:37:15,670 --> 00:37:13,839

don't have that authority it's it's

1069

00:37:17,510 --> 00:37:15,680

outside of their balance unless they

1070

00:37:19,349 --> 00:37:17,520

themselves want to get in trouble

1071

00:37:21,349 --> 00:37:19,359

however if it's an issue that they know

1072

00:37:23,030 --> 00:37:21,359

is significant to their constituents

1073

00:37:25,349 --> 00:37:23,040

they know that people are asking about

1074

00:37:27,430 --> 00:37:25,359

it they can certainly do

1075

00:37:28,790 --> 00:37:27,440

what we saw last year where there's

1076
00:37:31,589 --> 00:37:28,800
they're acknowledging that we're being

1077
00:37:33,750 --> 00:37:31,599
briefed on it and so i think uh the the

1078
00:37:36,550 --> 00:37:33,760
volume of public responses will come

1079
00:37:38,790 --> 00:37:36,560
from the volume in which people ask

1080
00:37:40,950 --> 00:37:38,800
for public responses including people in

1081
00:37:42,790 --> 00:37:40,960
the media and the public you know hey

1082
00:37:44,150 --> 00:37:42,800
have you been doing what's going on with

1083
00:37:46,150 --> 00:37:44,160
this what's going on with this i think

1084
00:37:48,710 --> 00:37:46,160
that's the only way that you're going to

1085
00:37:50,630 --> 00:37:48,720
get anything out of anybody

1086
00:37:51,910 --> 00:37:50,640
to what extent i don't know but at the

1087
00:37:53,589 --> 00:37:51,920
same time

1088
00:37:55,750 --> 00:37:53,599

we could likely get at least enough that

1089

00:37:57,990 --> 00:37:55,760

we got last year that at least either

1090

00:38:01,190 --> 00:37:58,000

establishes what they're being provided

1091

00:38:02,790 --> 00:38:01,200

continues to this is a legitimate topic

1092

00:38:06,790 --> 00:38:02,800

or you know

1093

00:38:08,870 --> 00:38:06,800

they're going ah this is bs and so um

1094

00:38:11,349 --> 00:38:08,880

be interesting i think we could likely

1095

00:38:13,670 --> 00:38:11,359

see all of that uh i think especially

1096

00:38:15,750 --> 00:38:13,680

now with with bender putting that out in

1097

00:38:17,190 --> 00:38:15,760

the ether um

1098

00:38:18,870 --> 00:38:17,200

certainly i may try to follow up on

1099

00:38:21,670 --> 00:38:18,880

there's certainly a lot of people who

1100

00:38:23,990 --> 00:38:21,680

should follow up on it yeah

1101
00:38:26,230 --> 00:38:24,000
i imagine i imagine they're the guy guys

1102
00:38:28,470 --> 00:38:26,240
at uap media we'll have something else

1103
00:38:30,230 --> 00:38:28,480
soon oh i noticed i i just want to say

1104
00:38:32,470 --> 00:38:30,240
this to everybody in the chat if i've

1105
00:38:35,270 --> 00:38:32,480
missed your questions i apologize but

1106
00:38:37,990 --> 00:38:35,280
when talking about the us government i

1107
00:38:39,750 --> 00:38:38,000
have to focus really hard because

1108
00:38:41,510 --> 00:38:39,760
it's a lot for me you know

1109
00:38:43,750 --> 00:38:41,520
coming from the uk especially so if i

1110
00:38:46,630 --> 00:38:43,760
missed your question i apologize we do

1111
00:38:48,390 --> 00:38:46,640
have one here from graham hello graham

1112
00:38:50,550 --> 00:38:48,400
does tim think that any lack of

1113
00:38:53,349 --> 00:38:50,560

cooperation and movement on the

1114

00:38:55,910 --> 00:38:53,359

usaf's part is down to legacy lack of

1115

00:38:59,670 --> 00:38:55,920

urgency or something else entirely great

1116

00:39:03,270 --> 00:39:02,069

all of the above

1117

00:39:05,589 --> 00:39:03,280

first of all it's great it's great to

1118

00:39:07,750 --> 00:39:05,599

hear from you graham um

1119

00:39:09,270 --> 00:39:07,760

and uh

1120

00:39:10,870 --> 00:39:09,280

yeah

1121

00:39:14,069 --> 00:39:10,880

all of the above

1122

00:39:14,870 --> 00:39:14,079

in in in a couple of ways so i don't

1123

00:39:17,349 --> 00:39:14,880

know

1124

00:39:19,829 --> 00:39:17,359

how much is purposeful

1125

00:39:20,950 --> 00:39:19,839

uh in terms of let's say a cover-up i

1126

00:39:23,829 --> 00:39:20,960

know a lot of people say there's a

1127

00:39:26,230 --> 00:39:23,839

cover-up maybe there is i don't know

1128

00:39:28,069 --> 00:39:26,240

i've never

1129

00:39:29,750 --> 00:39:28,079

encountered anything that that led me to

1130

00:39:32,150 --> 00:39:29,760

believe there was some kind of systemic

1131

00:39:33,510 --> 00:39:32,160

cover-up involving people who who

1132

00:39:35,829 --> 00:39:33,520

absolutely knew

1133

00:39:37,510 --> 00:39:35,839

for certain what the these objects were

1134

00:39:40,150 --> 00:39:37,520

that had crash retrievals this kind of

1135

00:39:41,670 --> 00:39:40,160

stuff maybe there are i just haven't

1136

00:39:42,950 --> 00:39:41,680

talked to those people i know that there

1137

00:39:45,270 --> 00:39:42,960

are some other people like ross

1138

00:39:47,270 --> 00:39:45,280

colthbert and others who have

1139

00:39:48,790 --> 00:39:47,280

um you know explored that particular

1140

00:39:50,950 --> 00:39:48,800

area so i don't want to make anybody mad

1141

00:39:52,870 --> 00:39:50,960

but i'm saying but what about the bodies

1142

00:39:55,109 --> 00:39:52,880

okay they maybe

1143

00:39:58,710 --> 00:39:55,119

um i just haven't encountered that

1144

00:40:00,550 --> 00:39:58,720

however um there is

1145

00:40:01,910 --> 00:40:00,560

de facto cover-up we have people who

1146

00:40:03,750 --> 00:40:01,920

feel like this isn't something they want

1147

00:40:05,270 --> 00:40:03,760

to discuss they don't want to deal with

1148

00:40:06,470 --> 00:40:05,280

it they don't want to be forced to deal

1149

00:40:08,790 --> 00:40:06,480

with it and so therefore they're going

1150

00:40:11,030 --> 00:40:08,800

to diminish it they're going to tell

1151
00:40:14,390 --> 00:40:11,040
people not to report it and everything

1152
00:40:17,349 --> 00:40:14,400
um not to cover up the existence of

1153
00:40:18,630 --> 00:40:17,359
something per se but but perhaps just to

1154
00:40:20,150 --> 00:40:18,640
try to make it go away because they

1155
00:40:22,150 --> 00:40:20,160
don't want to have to deal with it with

1156
00:40:24,069 --> 00:40:22,160
with the air force obviously they

1157
00:40:25,510 --> 00:40:24,079
handled blue book they were the ones in

1158
00:40:27,349 --> 00:40:25,520
charge of of

1159
00:40:29,430 --> 00:40:27,359
really the the only official

1160
00:40:31,750 --> 00:40:29,440
investigations that we saw

1161
00:40:33,670 --> 00:40:31,760
for the greater part up until recently

1162
00:40:36,230 --> 00:40:33,680
so the navy kind of stepped in and so i

1163
00:40:38,309 --> 00:40:36,240

would say there's probably uh some some

1164

00:40:40,950 --> 00:40:38,319

bitter taste or that has kind of

1165

00:40:42,790 --> 00:40:40,960

inherited yeah a legacy that has come

1166

00:40:44,550 --> 00:40:42,800

down from that because they really

1167

00:40:46,550 --> 00:40:44,560

wanted to wash their hands of it after

1168

00:40:47,910 --> 00:40:46,560

20 years of dealing with it but frankly

1169

00:40:49,829 --> 00:40:47,920

because i don't think they ever had it

1170

00:40:51,190 --> 00:40:49,839

they were no closer to

1171

00:40:52,390 --> 00:40:51,200

any answers

1172

00:40:55,030 --> 00:40:52,400

by the end than they were in the

1173

00:40:56,870 --> 00:40:55,040

beginning yeah it was the same thing

1174

00:40:57,990 --> 00:40:56,880

they're real we don't know what it is

1175

00:41:00,069 --> 00:40:58,000

and so

1176

00:41:01,589 --> 00:41:00,079

um i think that you have that and i

1177

00:41:04,710 --> 00:41:01,599

think that that

1178

00:41:07,109 --> 00:41:04,720

that comes down almost informally

1179

00:41:09,190 --> 00:41:07,119

where it's just the tone and and message

1180

00:41:11,589 --> 00:41:09,200

that's conveyed and that's the attitude

1181

00:41:13,190 --> 00:41:11,599

that is conveyed from above the officers

1182

00:41:14,950 --> 00:41:13,200

below and as they go through the ranks

1183

00:41:18,710 --> 00:41:14,960

it's the same one it stays it's kind of

1184

00:41:21,270 --> 00:41:18,720

a systemic uh willful apathy is what i

1185

00:41:22,870 --> 00:41:21,280

like to call it and so

1186

00:41:25,270 --> 00:41:22,880

i think that that out of all the

1187

00:41:26,390 --> 00:41:25,280

branches the air force would absolutely

1188

00:41:29,190 --> 00:41:26,400

be the one

1189

00:41:31,990 --> 00:41:29,200

uh that has that the most uh the where

1190

00:41:34,230 --> 00:41:32,000

the air force is also

1191

00:41:36,230 --> 00:41:34,240

it's an interesting branch out of all

1192

00:41:39,270 --> 00:41:36,240

the services

1193

00:41:41,670 --> 00:41:39,280

it's it's a different branch i will say

1194

00:41:44,150 --> 00:41:41,680

um from from growing up and being around

1195

00:41:46,710 --> 00:41:44,160

army branches my entire

1196

00:41:48,550 --> 00:41:46,720

life up until recently in germany i will

1197

00:41:50,870 --> 00:41:48,560

say it has been a difference coming

1198

00:41:53,109 --> 00:41:50,880

around an arm or an air force post and

1199

00:41:54,230 --> 00:41:53,119

so that in and of itself the air force

1200

00:41:56,870 --> 00:41:54,240

is just

1201

00:41:58,630 --> 00:41:56,880

it's a different branch there's just

1202

00:41:59,829 --> 00:41:58,640

different different people who typically

1203

00:42:01,430 --> 00:41:59,839

go in the air force and different

1204

00:42:03,349 --> 00:42:01,440

priorities and just

1205

00:42:06,790 --> 00:42:03,359

different approaches

1206

00:42:09,190 --> 00:42:06,800

and so i can't say for certain

1207

00:42:10,630 --> 00:42:09,200

what it is other than

1208

00:42:13,030 --> 00:42:10,640

it definitely out of everyone the air

1209

00:42:14,790 --> 00:42:13,040

force seems to be the most resistant

1210

00:42:17,910 --> 00:42:14,800

uh and i would say that if i had to

1211

00:42:20,550 --> 00:42:17,920

speculate it's probably a totality of

1212

00:42:22,470 --> 00:42:20,560

you know certainly

1213

00:42:24,230 --> 00:42:22,480

there's not twenty thousand thirty

1214

00:42:26,550 --> 00:42:24,240

thousand people who are in on the

1215

00:42:29,030 --> 00:42:26,560

cover-up so even if there's like this

1216

00:42:31,349 --> 00:42:29,040

you know small level uh that's that's

1217

00:42:33,190 --> 00:42:31,359

setting that tone the prevailing theme

1218

00:42:35,030 --> 00:42:33,200

as it's spread out is this kind of

1219

00:42:38,790 --> 00:42:35,040

willful apathy

1220

00:42:41,510 --> 00:42:38,800

yeah um jay allen here says uh vinnie

1221

00:42:42,710 --> 00:42:41,520

yousaf speaking so yep jay allen good to

1222

00:42:45,190 --> 00:42:42,720

see you my friend i know you're a

1223

00:42:47,270 --> 00:42:45,200

regular here um okay we admit they are

1224

00:42:50,150 --> 00:42:47,280

real and they on our towers or foreign

1225

00:42:52,069 --> 00:42:50,160

assets what now do we admit we can't do

1226

00:42:54,870 --> 00:42:52,079

anything about these incursions where is

1227

00:42:57,190 --> 00:42:54,880

the panic line

1228

00:42:59,829 --> 00:42:57,200

that's a i mean really great question

1229

00:43:01,990 --> 00:42:59,839

and so i think that uh i mean first of

1230

00:43:04,150 --> 00:43:02,000

all i think that if you reach a

1231

00:43:04,950 --> 00:43:04,160

definitive conclusion in which you say

1232

00:43:06,150 --> 00:43:04,960

okay

1233

00:43:09,510 --> 00:43:06,160

these are

1234

00:43:11,589 --> 00:43:09,520

ours

1235

00:43:12,550 --> 00:43:11,599

these are absolutely real

1236

00:43:15,030 --> 00:43:12,560

um

1237

00:43:17,510 --> 00:43:15,040

i think that now at this point in time

1238

00:43:19,670 --> 00:43:17,520

frankly if you want to see anything

1239

00:43:22,230 --> 00:43:19,680

meaningful done it has to be brought out

1240

00:43:24,950 --> 00:43:22,240

of uh the defense national security

1241

00:43:26,390 --> 00:43:24,960

sector because you they're going to

1242

00:43:28,630 --> 00:43:26,400

treat it exactly like they would a

1243

00:43:30,150 --> 00:43:28,640

defensive national security issue

1244

00:43:31,109 --> 00:43:30,160

uh and i'm not going to begrudge them

1245

00:43:32,790 --> 00:43:31,119

for that

1246

00:43:34,150 --> 00:43:32,800

and so when you're treating it like a

1247

00:43:35,190 --> 00:43:34,160

defense and national security issue

1248

00:43:36,630 --> 00:43:35,200

particularly if you're talking about

1249

00:43:39,430 --> 00:43:36,640

something that

1250

00:43:41,750 --> 00:43:39,440

you have no actual intelligence on and

1251
00:43:44,870 --> 00:43:41,760
you have no defense against and it can

1252
00:43:46,390 --> 00:43:44,880
move with impunity into your airspace

1253
00:43:49,589 --> 00:43:46,400
you you

1254
00:43:52,390 --> 00:43:49,599
you're entirely vulnerable to it that is

1255
00:43:54,630 --> 00:43:52,400
it under the guise of a defense issue

1256
00:43:56,470 --> 00:43:54,640
that is a huge

1257
00:43:59,349 --> 00:43:56,480
defense risk and it's something that you

1258
00:44:00,550 --> 00:43:59,359
treat as ultra classified you're not

1259
00:44:01,990 --> 00:44:00,560
going to discuss it it's not going to be

1260
00:44:04,309 --> 00:44:02,000
a public issue and it's going to be

1261
00:44:05,589 --> 00:44:04,319
narrow to those compartmentalized of

1262
00:44:07,829 --> 00:44:05,599
scopes

1263
00:44:10,630 --> 00:44:07,839

and i don't know that that's actually

1264

00:44:12,550 --> 00:44:10,640

beneficial whatsoever into solving

1265

00:44:14,309 --> 00:44:12,560

because that not only does that cut the

1266

00:44:16,710 --> 00:44:14,319

public out of the loop but it narrows

1267

00:44:18,870 --> 00:44:16,720

the scope of of people who could

1268

00:44:20,069 --> 00:44:18,880

potentially provide scientific or

1269

00:44:23,670 --> 00:44:20,079

academic

1270

00:44:25,750 --> 00:44:23,680

research and uh can contribute to

1271

00:44:28,230 --> 00:44:25,760

actually solving it and so i think if

1272

00:44:31,349 --> 00:44:28,240

that ever becomes the case it would be

1273

00:44:33,990 --> 00:44:31,359

extremely interesting uh if i was the

1274

00:44:37,670 --> 00:44:34,000

department of defense um and i reached

1275

00:44:39,829 --> 00:44:37,680

that conclusion i would gladly then say

1276

00:44:41,670 --> 00:44:39,839

go to the president whoever and say mr

1277

00:44:44,069 --> 00:44:41,680

president this is not a defense issue

1278

00:44:45,430 --> 00:44:44,079

this is a scientific technological

1279

00:44:46,950 --> 00:44:45,440

matter and we would like to hand this

1280

00:44:48,710 --> 00:44:46,960

off to

1281

00:44:50,870 --> 00:44:48,720

whoever

1282

00:44:53,910 --> 00:44:50,880

this is um

1283

00:44:56,150 --> 00:44:53,920

and i'd pass that buck to somebody um

1284

00:44:58,309 --> 00:44:56,160

who could treat it like a scientific

1285

00:45:00,870 --> 00:44:58,319

technical matter you know still provide

1286

00:45:02,470 --> 00:45:00,880

assistance you can still have

1287

00:45:04,309 --> 00:45:02,480

defense components that provide

1288

00:45:05,589 --> 00:45:04,319

assistance through classified sensor

1289

00:45:08,470 --> 00:45:05,599

systems this kind of stuff you can still

1290

00:45:10,470 --> 00:45:08,480

provide that information but do it under

1291

00:45:12,150 --> 00:45:10,480

a scientific context

1292

00:45:15,109 --> 00:45:12,160

yeah sure

1293

00:45:16,790 --> 00:45:15,119

uh dan's here as well hello dan uh tim

1294

00:45:19,030 --> 00:45:16,800

do you know if censors have been tasked

1295

00:45:22,790 --> 00:45:19,040

with tracking uap using parameters set

1296

00:45:27,270 --> 00:45:24,390

for a fact no

1297

00:45:29,750 --> 00:45:27,280

uh have i heard lots of of

1298

00:45:33,030 --> 00:45:29,760

rumors or mummings or

1299

00:45:36,550 --> 00:45:33,040

have i heard from people who have worked

1300

00:45:38,470 --> 00:45:36,560

in even the more modern uap programs um

1301

00:45:40,550 --> 00:45:38,480

or even who have worked in other

1302

00:45:43,190 --> 00:45:40,560

branches of government who

1303

00:45:44,470 --> 00:45:43,200

would have tasking on this so so maybe

1304

00:45:46,950 --> 00:45:44,480

they weren't assigned to the task force

1305

00:45:49,349 --> 00:45:46,960

let's say but if they work at an agency

1306

00:45:51,109 --> 00:45:49,359

uh that might have certain sensor suites

1307

00:45:53,030 --> 00:45:51,119

and and somebody the task force might

1308

00:45:55,510 --> 00:45:53,040

call them up they might be their uh

1309

00:45:57,829 --> 00:45:55,520

billet their liaison to it have they

1310

00:46:00,390 --> 00:45:57,839

been asked to do that kind of thing they

1311

00:46:02,550 --> 00:46:00,400

i have been told yes now what those

1312

00:46:04,710 --> 00:46:02,560

parameters are i don't know uh that kind

1313

00:46:06,870 --> 00:46:04,720

of stuff is classified with the sensors

1314

00:46:08,309 --> 00:46:06,880

themselves or different systems being

1315

00:46:09,990 --> 00:46:08,319

used i don't know

1316

00:46:12,309 --> 00:46:10,000

all of that is classified

1317

00:46:13,349 --> 00:46:12,319

um you know i caveat that when you know

1318

00:46:15,030 --> 00:46:13,359

because i started that by saying i've

1319

00:46:16,470 --> 00:46:15,040

heard rumors and you're saying but tim

1320

00:46:17,750 --> 00:46:16,480

you you're saying you've talked to

1321

00:46:19,430 --> 00:46:17,760

people who work in government that work

1322

00:46:21,510 --> 00:46:19,440

at this place who've said it that's not

1323

00:46:22,390 --> 00:46:21,520

a rumor that should be firsthand

1324

00:46:24,870 --> 00:46:22,400

um

1325

00:46:26,630 --> 00:46:24,880

yes that's correct and i think in a lot

1326
00:46:29,270 --> 00:46:26,640
of instances maybe that's better than

1327
00:46:31,750 --> 00:46:29,280
rumors but at the same time

1328
00:46:33,670 --> 00:46:31,760
i say that under the big caveat that

1329
00:46:35,829 --> 00:46:33,680
that's always first

1330
00:46:38,069 --> 00:46:35,839
you only have one source that's saying

1331
00:46:40,150 --> 00:46:38,079
that you only have one person

1332
00:46:41,910 --> 00:46:40,160
and uh for obvious reasons there's no

1333
00:46:44,069 --> 00:46:41,920
material evidence to support that kind

1334
00:46:46,710 --> 00:46:44,079
of claim and so for something like that

1335
00:46:49,589 --> 00:46:46,720
me to say definitively

1336
00:46:52,470 --> 00:46:49,599
i would need kind of multiple people

1337
00:46:54,069 --> 00:46:52,480
to all corroborate the same thing or

1338
00:46:56,470 --> 00:46:54,079

physical evidence and that's extremely

1339

00:46:59,030 --> 00:46:56,480

hard to do since even hearing about it

1340

00:47:00,950 --> 00:46:59,040

is kind of dancing the line

1341

00:47:03,030 --> 00:47:00,960

of what's classified but but i have

1342

00:47:05,589 --> 00:47:03,040

heard that that

1343

00:47:08,069 --> 00:47:05,599

is the case and i don't know if that's

1344

00:47:10,790 --> 00:47:08,079

i've heard nuclear as well i don't know

1345

00:47:12,390 --> 00:47:10,800

in what context

1346

00:47:14,390 --> 00:47:12,400

you know whether that is just merely

1347

00:47:16,790 --> 00:47:14,400

monitoring certain nuclear

1348

00:47:18,550 --> 00:47:16,800

assets when they're in place such as the

1349

00:47:20,870 --> 00:47:18,560

aircraft carriers the nuclear power that

1350

00:47:22,870 --> 00:47:20,880

are on them whether it's nuclear-powered

1351

00:47:25,349 --> 00:47:22,880

submarines whether it's submarines with

1352

00:47:27,990 --> 00:47:25,359

nuclear warheads i don't know that that

1353

00:47:30,069 --> 00:47:28,000

but i know that that nuclear energy has

1354

00:47:31,910 --> 00:47:30,079

always come up a lot in those kind of

1355

00:47:33,349 --> 00:47:31,920

conversations

1356

00:47:36,470 --> 00:47:33,359

yeah for sure

1357

00:47:38,390 --> 00:47:36,480

um yonei asks tim i wonder since you

1358

00:47:40,390 --> 00:47:38,400

live in germany does the government pay

1359

00:47:42,069 --> 00:47:40,400

any attention to the phenomena or is it

1360

00:47:43,510 --> 00:47:42,079

covered in the news here in the

1361

00:47:45,030 --> 00:47:43,520

netherlands unfortunately it's not

1362

00:47:47,270 --> 00:47:45,040

covered at all

1363

00:47:50,069 --> 00:47:47,280

yeah absolutely not

1364

00:47:53,270 --> 00:47:50,079

absolutely not i would say that

1365

00:47:56,710 --> 00:47:53,280

it is um almost

1366

00:47:59,910 --> 00:47:56,720

non-existent you know in german media um

1367

00:48:02,870 --> 00:47:59,920

and and the general german public uh

1368

00:48:05,670 --> 00:48:02,880

uh for the most part i would say is is

1369

00:48:06,710 --> 00:48:05,680

certainly not even near as interested as

1370

00:48:08,309 --> 00:48:06,720

um

1371

00:48:10,870 --> 00:48:08,319

as people in especially in the united

1372

00:48:12,790 --> 00:48:10,880

states in the united kingdom and so but

1373

00:48:14,309 --> 00:48:12,800

it's it's absolutely not on the news i

1374

00:48:16,710 --> 00:48:14,319

can tell you that much even at the

1375

00:48:18,150 --> 00:48:16,720

height of um

1376

00:48:19,510 --> 00:48:18,160

you know when the when the u.s

1377

00:48:21,589 --> 00:48:19,520

department of defense is talking about

1378

00:48:23,270 --> 00:48:21,599

it when the u.s is is passing bills

1379

00:48:24,950 --> 00:48:23,280

about it so even when you you see

1380

00:48:27,589 --> 00:48:24,960

politico and the washington post and the

1381

00:48:30,790 --> 00:48:27,599

new york times um

1382

00:48:32,069 --> 00:48:30,800

german media is not covering that

1383

00:48:34,470 --> 00:48:32,079

whatsoever

1384

00:48:35,990 --> 00:48:34,480

so yeah no

1385

00:48:38,390 --> 00:48:36,000

we it's it's funny because here in the

1386

00:48:39,829 --> 00:48:38,400

uk we we want more it to be taken more

1387

00:48:42,030 --> 00:48:39,839

seriously but then we get the sun and

1388

00:48:44,950 --> 00:48:42,040

the daily star putting out these just

1389

00:48:47,430 --> 00:48:44,960

sensationalist nonsense stories nine

1390

00:48:49,430 --> 00:48:47,440

times out of ten and it really doesn't

1391

00:48:51,589 --> 00:48:49,440

help at all but then the odd the odd

1392

00:48:54,950 --> 00:48:51,599

article does have you know

1393

00:48:57,750 --> 00:48:54,960

some some weight to it it's difficult

1394

00:49:00,069 --> 00:48:57,760

it is i i would say that the the uk

1395

00:49:02,150 --> 00:49:00,079

media has kind of come in second uh and

1396

00:49:05,349 --> 00:49:02,160

i think it matches with the interest

1397

00:49:07,589 --> 00:49:05,359

level as well uh australia has done some

1398

00:49:08,549 --> 00:49:07,599

some fairly decent stuff i i think it

1399

00:49:14,790 --> 00:49:08,559

takes

1400

00:49:16,870 --> 00:49:14,800

markets or anybody to to specifically

1401

00:49:19,030 --> 00:49:16,880

task a journalist you know an editor say

1402

00:49:20,470 --> 00:49:19,040

look what the hell's going on over the

1403

00:49:22,230 --> 00:49:20,480

united states with this i need you to

1404

00:49:24,230 --> 00:49:22,240

try to get to the bottom of it

1405

00:49:26,150 --> 00:49:24,240

uh where you can get a really rich and

1406

00:49:28,069 --> 00:49:26,160

in-depth kind of article or news piece

1407

00:49:29,430 --> 00:49:28,079

to be brought to a different foreign

1408

00:49:31,190 --> 00:49:29,440

market

1409

00:49:34,309 --> 00:49:31,200

unfortunately

1410

00:49:36,069 --> 00:49:34,319

that really hasn't been done it it isn't

1411

00:49:37,190 --> 00:49:36,079

done uh

1412

00:49:39,030 --> 00:49:37,200

and

1413

00:49:41,829 --> 00:49:39,040

i think it's probably mitigating with

1414

00:49:43,990 --> 00:49:41,839

these news companies a resources so so

1415

00:49:44,870 --> 00:49:44,000

your foreign correspondents are limited

1416

00:49:46,870 --> 00:49:44,880

um

1417

00:49:49,109 --> 00:49:46,880

and you know what do you designate them

1418

00:49:51,270 --> 00:49:49,119

to do that type of thing and maybe the

1419

00:49:52,630 --> 00:49:51,280

general idea of prevailing belief that

1420

00:49:55,109 --> 00:49:52,640

it's not going to be

1421

00:49:58,309 --> 00:49:55,119

very interesting to your audience and

1422

00:50:00,790 --> 00:49:58,319

and for here in germany that i would say

1423

00:50:03,589 --> 00:50:00,800

that that's a big factor i mean a lot of

1424

00:50:05,349 --> 00:50:03,599

things that that are uh

1425

00:50:07,990 --> 00:50:05,359

that seem very normal that we're very

1426

00:50:09,670 --> 00:50:08,000

accustomed to you you couldn't turn on a

1427

00:50:11,829 --> 00:50:09,680

television show in the u.s without some

1428

00:50:14,069 --> 00:50:11,839

kind of paranormal or ghost hunting show

1429

00:50:15,990 --> 00:50:14,079

or something like that that's just

1430

00:50:16,950 --> 00:50:16,000

not something that the people

1431

00:50:18,870 --> 00:50:16,960

um

1432

00:50:20,470 --> 00:50:18,880

in germany are really interested in

1433

00:50:22,549 --> 00:50:20,480

whatsoever yeah

1434

00:50:24,630 --> 00:50:22,559

no i can understand it i mean hopefully

1435

00:50:26,549 --> 00:50:24,640

in the future as this all picks up that

1436

00:50:28,710 --> 00:50:26,559

might change but i guess again it's

1437

00:50:30,870 --> 00:50:28,720

patience and time

1438

00:50:33,109 --> 00:50:30,880

i would i would hope so i mean i you

1439

00:50:34,950 --> 00:50:33,119

know i will be the first to admit i like

1440

00:50:37,430 --> 00:50:34,960

a good ghost story and i'm surrounded by

1441

00:50:39,270 --> 00:50:37,440

hundreds of years of history and tragic

1442

00:50:40,710 --> 00:50:39,280

battles and uh you know it was one of

1443

00:50:42,150 --> 00:50:40,720

the things i actually looked for i was

1444

00:50:44,790 --> 00:50:42,160

like man is there any good ghost stories

1445

00:50:47,430 --> 00:50:44,800

around here you know we just they're fun

1446

00:50:49,109 --> 00:50:47,440

legends and uh yeah only i only found

1447

00:50:51,589 --> 00:50:49,119

one uh

1448

00:50:53,190 --> 00:50:51,599

here near me about a werewolf which i

1449

00:50:55,270 --> 00:50:53,200

need to publish that article i may hold

1450

00:50:58,069 --> 00:50:55,280

it until halloween this year but that's

1451
00:51:00,230 --> 00:50:58,079
a good idea i i will i will i'll give

1452
00:51:03,190 --> 00:51:00,240
you the exclusive teaser

1453
00:51:06,069 --> 00:51:03,200
i actually tracked down

1454
00:51:08,950 --> 00:51:06,079
the last european werewolf

1455
00:51:11,109 --> 00:51:08,960
whoa the actual person

1456
00:51:13,190 --> 00:51:11,119
the actual person so the legend is out

1457
00:51:15,270 --> 00:51:13,200
there if you look at the morbach monster

1458
00:51:16,950 --> 00:51:15,280
in germany which is not far from me you

1459
00:51:19,190 --> 00:51:16,960
might be able to find it but but after

1460
00:51:21,750 --> 00:51:19,200
extensive i'm embarrassed to even say

1461
00:51:24,150 --> 00:51:21,760
how much work i did into it going to

1462
00:51:26,390 --> 00:51:24,160
going to national archives in france it

1463
00:51:27,510 --> 00:51:26,400

became an obsession just to find this

1464

00:51:28,790 --> 00:51:27,520

werewolf

1465

00:51:30,549 --> 00:51:28,800

and uh

1466

00:51:33,030 --> 00:51:30,559

i not only found the grave but the

1467

00:51:34,950 --> 00:51:33,040

actual person that is supposedly the

1468

00:51:36,470 --> 00:51:34,960

werewolf so

1469

00:51:38,230 --> 00:51:36,480

i need to publish it

1470

00:51:39,670 --> 00:51:38,240

maybe i'll handle it and yeah i don't

1471

00:51:41,589 --> 00:51:39,680

have impressed like i said it became an

1472

00:51:43,510 --> 00:51:41,599

obsession who who goes to france to look

1473

00:51:45,510 --> 00:51:43,520

through archives and stuff to find them

1474

00:51:47,670 --> 00:51:45,520

but uh but it became this interesting

1475

00:51:49,430 --> 00:51:47,680

thing were they real you know

1476
00:51:51,750 --> 00:51:49,440
it's a long way of me saying that i

1477
00:51:53,829 --> 00:51:51,760
enjoy a good paranormal story

1478
00:51:55,430 --> 00:51:53,839
yeah yeah absolutely we're steeped in it

1479
00:51:57,670 --> 00:51:55,440
here in the uk so i could fully

1480
00:51:59,750 --> 00:51:57,680
appreciate that absolutely

1481
00:52:00,950 --> 00:51:59,760
um now listen we're running up almost

1482
00:52:04,069 --> 00:52:00,960
against the clock i'm going to ask you

1483
00:52:06,069 --> 00:52:04,079
this one last question

1484
00:52:08,870 --> 00:52:06,079
on another show recently you were asked

1485
00:52:10,630 --> 00:52:08,880
about the 23 minute video that is

1486
00:52:11,910 --> 00:52:10,640
now kind of infamous in the halls of

1487
00:52:12,790 --> 00:52:11,920
ufology

1488
00:52:14,309 --> 00:52:12,800

um

1489

00:52:16,710 --> 00:52:14,319

but you stated that you believe there's

1490

00:52:19,030 --> 00:52:16,720

probably better footage out there

1491

00:52:20,950 --> 00:52:19,040

now to what extent

1492

00:52:22,470 --> 00:52:20,960

do you know that that's the case or have

1493

00:52:24,069 --> 00:52:22,480

you been told anything

1494

00:52:25,270 --> 00:52:24,079

can you elaborate on why you made that

1495

00:52:27,430 --> 00:52:25,280

statement

1496

00:52:28,309 --> 00:52:27,440

sure yeah um

1497

00:52:31,430 --> 00:52:28,319

yeah

1498

00:52:33,109 --> 00:52:31,440

in terms of the the 23 minute video you

1499

00:52:34,710 --> 00:52:33,119

know that uh

1500

00:52:36,309 --> 00:52:34,720

i certainly

1501
00:52:38,470 --> 00:52:36,319
believe i don't know what it shows but i

1502
00:52:41,349 --> 00:52:38,480
do believe it exists primarily because

1503
00:52:43,349 --> 00:52:41,359
my sourcing on its existence uh

1504
00:52:44,150 --> 00:52:43,359
came from some leaked documents that

1505
00:52:45,589 --> 00:52:44,160
were

1506
00:52:47,990 --> 00:52:45,599
official and so

1507
00:52:50,710 --> 00:52:48,000
i would assume that one would not just

1508
00:52:53,030 --> 00:52:50,720
falsify uh you know documents to that

1509
00:52:55,430 --> 00:52:53,040
extent but again i don't know what

1510
00:52:56,950 --> 00:52:55,440
uh i don't know exactly what it shows

1511
00:52:57,910 --> 00:52:56,960
but but it was specific enough that i

1512
00:52:59,910 --> 00:52:57,920
you know

1513
00:53:01,270 --> 00:52:59,920

say 23 minutes and 47 seconds or

1514

00:53:03,750 --> 00:53:01,280

something like there was an exact kind

1515

00:53:05,990 --> 00:53:03,760

of time frame on there uh but but when i

1516

00:53:07,829 --> 00:53:06,000

said that my belief that um

1517

00:53:11,910 --> 00:53:07,839

there was better information is that

1518

00:53:15,910 --> 00:53:11,920

particular video in question there

1519

00:53:23,349 --> 00:53:19,829

2013 2014 to 15 time frame it's just

1520

00:53:26,309 --> 00:53:23,359

based on the documents i saw and so um

1521

00:53:27,750 --> 00:53:26,319

you know there's better technology

1522

00:53:29,910 --> 00:53:27,760

in the past

1523

00:53:32,069 --> 00:53:29,920

seven eight six years

1524

00:53:33,430 --> 00:53:32,079

in addition to tasking different

1525

00:53:36,549 --> 00:53:33,440

technology

1526

00:53:38,950 --> 00:53:36,559

and uh you know we have been there's

1527

00:53:43,349 --> 00:53:38,960

been a lot of

1528

00:53:44,950 --> 00:53:43,359

curious defense issues that have arrived

1529

00:53:47,270 --> 00:53:44,960

than in the last few years that don't

1530

00:53:49,109 --> 00:53:47,280

relate to uap but rather let's say the

1531

00:53:50,630 --> 00:53:49,119

situation in ukraine you know russia was

1532

00:53:52,630 --> 00:53:50,640

building up this

1533

00:53:54,870 --> 00:53:52,640

for this invasion for over a year

1534

00:53:57,190 --> 00:53:54,880

you have the situation going on in china

1535

00:53:59,990 --> 00:53:57,200

which is really heated up in the last

1536

00:54:01,829 --> 00:54:00,000

five six years um and then obviously

1537

00:54:03,990 --> 00:54:01,839

you've got iran you've got all these

1538

00:54:05,750 --> 00:54:04,000

different issues that require a lot of

1539

00:54:07,190 --> 00:54:05,760

precise intelligence you want to know

1540

00:54:09,030 --> 00:54:07,200

technical intelligence what are they

1541

00:54:11,270 --> 00:54:09,040

testing what are they flying these types

1542

00:54:13,190 --> 00:54:11,280

of things so that means that you

1543

00:54:15,430 --> 00:54:13,200

both develop enhance

1544

00:54:17,750 --> 00:54:15,440

sensor capabilities and intelligence

1545

00:54:20,309 --> 00:54:17,760

capabilities to gather different forms

1546

00:54:22,470 --> 00:54:20,319

of data and you employ them

1547

00:54:25,829 --> 00:54:22,480

potentially to more extreme than you

1548

00:54:27,589 --> 00:54:25,839

have in the past after the early 1990s

1549

00:54:29,829 --> 00:54:27,599

we really weren't spying on russia all

1550

00:54:31,270 --> 00:54:29,839

that much we could in fact we could

1551
00:54:32,710 --> 00:54:31,280
we could buy the plans the nukes for a

1552
00:54:33,910 --> 00:54:32,720
bottle of vodka

1553
00:54:35,990 --> 00:54:33,920
after

1554
00:54:39,190 --> 00:54:36,000
the collapse of the soviet union so you

1555
00:54:41,109 --> 00:54:39,200
didn't necessarily need to to rely on

1556
00:54:42,950 --> 00:54:41,119
some of your your more covert or your

1557
00:54:44,710 --> 00:54:42,960
more technological methods of collection

1558
00:54:46,870 --> 00:54:44,720
that's not been the case

1559
00:54:48,870 --> 00:54:46,880
and a lot of what we see where we see a

1560
00:54:50,390 --> 00:54:48,880
really kind of turbulent time right now

1561
00:54:52,309 --> 00:54:50,400
i mean where there's a war the biggest

1562
00:54:54,150 --> 00:54:52,319
war in europe that's been building for

1563
00:54:56,309 --> 00:54:54,160

the last couple of years and i think uh

1564

00:54:57,670 --> 00:54:56,319

in the defense community it has been

1565

00:54:58,789 --> 00:54:57,680

firmly aware of it didn't know whether

1566

00:55:00,710 --> 00:54:58,799

it would be china didn't know whether it

1567

00:55:01,829 --> 00:55:00,720

be russia but you knew what's going on

1568

00:55:04,230 --> 00:55:01,839

and so

1569

00:55:06,870 --> 00:55:04,240

de facto in spying on those types of

1570

00:55:09,589 --> 00:55:06,880

things you're going to encounter things

1571

00:55:11,829 --> 00:55:09,599

that are more frequent uh and so i think

1572

00:55:13,829 --> 00:55:11,839

that that in itself a the technology is

1573

00:55:16,950 --> 00:55:13,839

better b the potential to encounter it

1574

00:55:20,309 --> 00:55:16,960

is more frequent and i think uh given

1575

00:55:22,470 --> 00:55:20,319

the fact is particularly post 2017 when

1576

00:55:23,109 --> 00:55:22,480

when louis lozando came out atip came

1577

00:55:26,150 --> 00:55:23,119

out

1578

00:55:28,630 --> 00:55:26,160

suddenly people in government who who

1579

00:55:30,870 --> 00:55:28,640

had access to these things were like oh

1580

00:55:32,390 --> 00:55:30,880

cool i can i can look through this let

1581

00:55:35,190 --> 00:55:32,400

me look through some of my data or let

1582

00:55:37,349 --> 00:55:35,200

me actually use my assets specifically

1583

00:55:39,030 --> 00:55:37,359

look at certain things you can do that

1584

00:55:41,670 --> 00:55:39,040

and that goes back to what i mentioned

1585

00:55:43,990 --> 00:55:41,680

first earlier this idea that some of the

1586

00:55:45,990 --> 00:55:44,000

best work in government is done

1587

00:55:48,069 --> 00:55:46,000

not necessarily by an office with a big

1588

00:55:50,230 --> 00:55:48,079

flag pull-up point out front that says

1589

00:55:51,910 --> 00:55:50,240

you know uap agency

1590

00:55:54,950 --> 00:55:51,920

rather by by the

1591

00:55:57,349 --> 00:55:54,960

the analyst or the person who has access

1592

00:55:59,990 --> 00:55:57,359

to satellite technologies or airborne

1593

00:56:01,589 --> 00:56:00,000

technologies who says hey you know what

1594

00:56:04,230 --> 00:56:01,599

i'm going to go through and look at this

1595

00:56:05,589 --> 00:56:04,240

or you know what we've got a nuclear

1596

00:56:07,510 --> 00:56:05,599

carrier that's moving through the

1597

00:56:09,270 --> 00:56:07,520

mediterranean and i've got an airborne

1598

00:56:11,190 --> 00:56:09,280

asset i think i'm gonna watch it for a

1599

00:56:12,950 --> 00:56:11,200

while let's see if anything pops up over

1600

00:56:13,990 --> 00:56:12,960

here let's see what we get

1601
00:56:15,670 --> 00:56:14,000
and i know

1602
00:56:16,950 --> 00:56:15,680
i can for a fact

1603
00:56:19,990 --> 00:56:16,960
in some of the

1604
00:56:21,510 --> 00:56:20,000
um classified uh or excuse me they're

1605
00:56:23,750 --> 00:56:21,520
not classified but they're secure so

1606
00:56:27,829 --> 00:56:23,760
they're intelligence community only type

1607
00:56:29,430 --> 00:56:27,839
chat rooms they have uh at our space um

1608
00:56:30,950 --> 00:56:29,440
there was especially in the last year

1609
00:56:32,549 --> 00:56:30,960
there's been considerable chatter so

1610
00:56:34,309 --> 00:56:32,559
these are

1611
00:56:36,470 --> 00:56:34,319
it's kind of like discord for for

1612
00:56:37,910 --> 00:56:36,480
intelligence personnel where they can

1613
00:56:40,230 --> 00:56:37,920

discuss different things and they can

1614

00:56:41,190 --> 00:56:40,240

come together and these um you know

1615

00:56:42,789 --> 00:56:41,200

these

1616

00:56:43,990 --> 00:56:42,799

particularly with the uap topic you had

1617

00:56:45,430 --> 00:56:44,000

high level people that were coming

1618

00:56:46,549 --> 00:56:45,440

together and discussing it and so

1619

00:56:49,670 --> 00:56:46,559

suddenly

1620

00:56:50,549 --> 00:56:49,680

once it became acceptable i think that

1621

00:56:51,589 --> 00:56:50,559

people

1622

00:56:53,030 --> 00:56:51,599

stopped

1623

00:56:55,190 --> 00:56:53,040

throwing out

1624

00:56:56,549 --> 00:56:55,200

potentially good stuff into the trash

1625

00:56:58,950 --> 00:56:56,559

bin because they didn't think anybody

1626

00:57:01,349 --> 00:56:58,960

was they were told

1627

00:57:03,589 --> 00:57:01,359

to throw it out or that was the impli

1628

00:57:05,510 --> 00:57:03,599

implication throw it out uh and they

1629

00:57:09,190 --> 00:57:05,520

started looking for it and so i think

1630

00:57:11,750 --> 00:57:09,200

that that uh that definitely is

1631

00:57:13,270 --> 00:57:11,760

the impetus behind that statement uh on

1632

00:57:15,589 --> 00:57:13,280

top of the fact that there's been

1633

00:57:16,630 --> 00:57:15,599

there's certainly been plenty of people

1634

00:57:19,270 --> 00:57:16,640

who

1635

00:57:22,150 --> 00:57:19,280

were absolutely in the position to to

1636

00:57:23,270 --> 00:57:22,160

know who have said there is much better

1637

00:57:25,030 --> 00:57:23,280

stuff

1638

00:57:26,710 --> 00:57:25,040

yeah thank you so much that makes so

1639

00:57:29,670 --> 00:57:26,720

much sense yeah

1640

00:57:31,990 --> 00:57:29,680

i like that absolutely

1641

00:57:33,430 --> 00:57:32,000

down to it because i mentioned this and

1642

00:57:35,670 --> 00:57:33,440

i'll just say this i mentioned this in

1643

00:57:37,910 --> 00:57:35,680

an article myself and tom rogan wrote

1644

00:57:40,870 --> 00:57:37,920

for the debrief a year ago tom rogan

1645

00:57:42,390 --> 00:57:40,880

from washington examiner and um i said

1646

00:57:44,150 --> 00:57:42,400

that some of the best intelligence or

1647

00:57:45,990 --> 00:57:44,160

some of the best stuff that they had was

1648

00:57:47,270 --> 00:57:46,000

mason measurement and signals

1649

00:57:49,190 --> 00:57:47,280

intelligence

1650

00:57:51,510 --> 00:57:49,200

and i think

1651
00:57:54,390 --> 00:57:51,520
with the uap

1652
00:57:55,589 --> 00:57:54,400
report that came out um the june report

1653
00:57:57,589 --> 00:57:55,599
the preliminary report i think it

1654
00:57:58,630 --> 00:57:57,599
mentioned something about not having any

1655
00:58:00,549 --> 00:57:58,640
mason

1656
00:58:01,990 --> 00:58:00,559
and uh i think some people were like

1657
00:58:05,910 --> 00:58:02,000
ah-ha

1658
00:58:09,910 --> 00:58:05,920
you know there is none and uh you know

1659
00:58:11,829 --> 00:58:09,920
to that the point of that is is that uh

1660
00:58:12,870 --> 00:58:11,839
measurement signals that you collect is

1661
00:58:15,589 --> 00:58:12,880
evidence

1662
00:58:17,510 --> 00:58:15,599
the inability to collect

1663
00:58:20,470 --> 00:58:17,520

certain measurement and signals

1664

00:58:22,309 --> 00:58:20,480

is evidence and so

1665

00:58:24,789 --> 00:58:22,319

the point there being that some of the

1666

00:58:26,150 --> 00:58:24,799

best uh evidence is that when you have

1667

00:58:29,589 --> 00:58:26,160

some of the

1668

00:58:30,789 --> 00:58:29,599

world's best sensor suites and platforms

1669

00:58:32,470 --> 00:58:30,799

that can

1670

00:58:34,230 --> 00:58:32,480

tell you the exact plane they can tell

1671

00:58:36,470 --> 00:58:34,240

you you know that plane's being piloted

1672

00:58:38,950 --> 00:58:36,480

by you know sergi

1673

00:58:40,870 --> 00:58:38,960

his wife just left him and he had chili

1674

00:58:43,030 --> 00:58:40,880

for breakfast you know like they're that

1675

00:58:44,789 --> 00:58:43,040

good but when they're not able to give

1676

00:58:47,589 --> 00:58:44,799

you anything and they're not able to

1677

00:58:50,230 --> 00:58:47,599

even register that this is a mechanical

1678

00:58:52,230 --> 00:58:50,240

device this is an electronic device that

1679

00:58:54,230 --> 00:58:52,240

in itself is significant evidence

1680

00:58:57,109 --> 00:58:54,240

because that's not normal

1681

00:58:59,190 --> 00:58:57,119

so when you can detect even your best

1682

00:59:01,030 --> 00:58:59,200

adversary stealth

1683

00:59:02,789 --> 00:59:01,040

aerospace technologies but then you

1684

00:59:05,829 --> 00:59:02,799

cannot detect

1685

00:59:07,670 --> 00:59:05,839

this whatsoever that is evidence

1686

00:59:08,870 --> 00:59:07,680

so i think

1687

00:59:10,069 --> 00:59:08,880

there's a lot

1688

00:59:11,589 --> 00:59:10,079

there i know everybody wants the

1689

00:59:13,349 --> 00:59:11,599

pictures and videos though that's the

1690

00:59:17,109 --> 00:59:13,359

sexy stuff

1691

00:59:19,270 --> 00:59:17,119

uh which is understandable but you know

1692

00:59:21,270 --> 00:59:19,280

yeah each to their own you know i like

1693

00:59:22,710 --> 00:59:21,280

the data i like these kind of

1694

00:59:24,309 --> 00:59:22,720

discussions and what we're seeing

1695

00:59:25,829 --> 00:59:24,319

happening going through the government

1696

00:59:27,430 --> 00:59:25,839

now a lot of people will just go well i

1697

00:59:28,630 --> 00:59:27,440

don't trust the government i'm ignoring

1698

00:59:30,470 --> 00:59:28,640

that well

1699

00:59:31,349 --> 00:59:30,480

that's up to them but

1700

00:59:33,829 --> 00:59:31,359

yeah

1701

00:59:35,589 --> 00:59:33,839

i'm different

1702

00:59:37,910 --> 00:59:35,599

it's always a

1703

00:59:39,990 --> 00:59:37,920

a totality of everything i said if it

1704

00:59:42,069 --> 00:59:40,000

was just one person saying one thing

1705

00:59:44,390 --> 00:59:42,079

then i think there's absolutely reason

1706

00:59:46,309 --> 00:59:44,400

to be hesitant or question

1707

00:59:48,390 --> 00:59:46,319

or be suspicious better yet everybody

1708

00:59:49,910 --> 00:59:48,400

should nothing wrong with questioning uh

1709

00:59:52,150 --> 00:59:49,920

but i think when you've got an abundance

1710

00:59:55,030 --> 00:59:52,160

of people that are kind of saying the

1711

00:59:57,910 --> 00:59:55,040

same things uh it's interesting it's

1712

01:00:00,150 --> 00:59:57,920

it's certainly interesting i think yeah

1713

01:00:03,270 --> 01:00:00,160

for anyone in the united states if if

1714

01:00:06,069 --> 01:00:03,280

they really really really want to know

1715

01:00:07,510 --> 01:00:06,079

so so so badly my recommendation to be

1716

01:00:08,309 --> 01:00:07,520

to them would be

1717

01:00:09,750 --> 01:00:08,319

uh

1718

01:00:12,150 --> 01:00:09,760

well they're running a little late for

1719

01:00:14,069 --> 01:00:12,160

this midterm but but the next elections

1720

01:00:15,750 --> 01:00:14,079

man run for office and try to get on the

1721

01:00:17,670 --> 01:00:15,760

intel committee yeah

1722

01:00:20,309 --> 01:00:17,680

if you wanna i mean i know we push them

1723

01:00:21,190 --> 01:00:20,319

in everything i know we we send a lot of

1724

01:00:22,710 --> 01:00:21,200

uh

1725

01:00:24,789 --> 01:00:22,720

people send a lot of political things

1726

01:00:25,589 --> 01:00:24,799

and contact their lawmakers as they

1727

01:00:27,349 --> 01:00:25,599

should

1728

01:00:29,270 --> 01:00:27,359

uh but at the end of the day if you

1729

01:00:30,309 --> 01:00:29,280

really really want to know you know

1730

01:00:33,349 --> 01:00:30,319

maybe

1731

01:00:37,589 --> 01:00:33,359

launch the campaign man you know

1732

01:00:39,270 --> 01:00:37,599

so and so for congress and get the win

1733

01:00:41,190 --> 01:00:39,280

let me know if you do you let me know i

1734

01:00:42,789 --> 01:00:41,200

might have a new source so keep me you

1735

01:00:46,230 --> 01:00:42,799

know if that happens

1736

01:00:49,990 --> 01:00:48,309

sound advice well tim we've just about

1737

01:00:51,670 --> 01:00:50,000

hit the hour i really really want to

1738

01:00:53,670 --> 01:00:51,680

thank you so much for coming on it's

1739

01:00:56,230 --> 01:00:53,680

always a great conversation

1740

01:00:57,990 --> 01:00:56,240

sure everybody here

1741

01:00:59,670 --> 01:00:58,000

anytime and we have to do it regularly

1742

01:01:01,829 --> 01:00:59,680

because i could you know i could do this

1743

01:01:03,430 --> 01:01:01,839

for hours uh everyone in the live chat

1744

01:01:04,710 --> 01:01:03,440

thank you so much for being cordial

1745

01:01:06,789 --> 01:01:04,720

keeping it a really pleasant

1746

01:01:08,470 --> 01:01:06,799

conversation from what i've seen uh

1747

01:01:10,150 --> 01:01:08,480

anybody that's listening to this after

1748

01:01:12,390 --> 01:01:10,160

the fact on the anomalous podcast

1749

01:01:13,430 --> 01:01:12,400

podcast network thank you so much as

1750

01:01:14,950 --> 01:01:13,440

well

1751

01:01:17,270 --> 01:01:14,960

i'm going to be back next week with

1752

01:01:18,309 --> 01:01:17,280

caroline corey director of a tear in the

1753

01:01:20,789 --> 01:01:18,319

sky

1754

01:01:22,470 --> 01:01:20,799

i'm also going to be on instagram this

1755

01:01:25,349 --> 01:01:22,480

week with graham rendell talking about

1756

01:01:26,870 --> 01:01:25,359

his new book and then the

1757

01:01:28,630 --> 01:01:26,880

i'm losing track of everything i've got

1758

01:01:30,870 --> 01:01:28,640

going on i think later this week i'm on

1759

01:01:32,789 --> 01:01:30,880

with the guys from you apx live on

1760

01:01:33,750 --> 01:01:32,799

instagram as well but just follow me

1761

01:01:36,230 --> 01:01:33,760

everywhere

1762

01:01:38,309 --> 01:01:36,240

and you'll find it so yeah that's it for

1763

01:01:40,309 --> 01:01:38,319

now guys uh i'm gonna love you and leave